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Abstract
This report presents summary findings from the Value for Money (VFM) analysis conducted for  
six DFID-funded programmes between September 2013 and April 2015. Based on these findings,  
the report formulates insights on how VFM analysis can be used to improve WASH programming.  
We identify challenges in doing such analysis and formulate recommendations to overcome these 
challenges to bring VFM analysis into the mainstream.
The VFM-WASH project 
This report is an output of the VFM-WASH project, which stands for “Value for Money and 
Sustainability in WASH programmes”. This was a two-year research project funded by DFID, 
conducting operational research into DFID’s WASH programmes in six countries. A consortium  
of five organisations, led by OPM, has carried out the work. Research Partners are the University  
of Leeds, Trémolet Consulting, the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine and Oxfam. 
The project had two main objectives:
1 To identify how VFM and sustainability can be improved in DFID-funded WASH programmes 
through operational research in six countries (Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Nigeria, Pakistan 
and Zambia). In each of these countries, the project team conducted a VFM analysis of a DFID-
funded WASH programme. Focus programmes were implemented by the country’s government,  
by large organisations such as UNICEF or by small NGOs; 
2 To assess the sustainability of rural WASH services in Africa and South Asia by carrying out 
nationally-representative household surveys in four countries (Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Mozambique 
and Pakistan), alongside gathering secondary data for a larger group of countries (e.g. existing 
surveys and Water Point Mapping initiatives).
See the project website for more information: http://vfm-wash.org
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1 Introduction 
This synthesis report is one of the main outputs of the VFM-WASH project, which stands for 
“Value for Money and Sustainability in WASH programmes”. Under this project, research activities 
were carried out in six countries where DFID has made significant investments in the WASH  
sector, including Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Nigeria, Pakistan and Zambia. VFM analysis 
was carried out in all six countries (what we refer to as “Objective 1”) whereas surveys on the 
sustainability of WASH infrastructure at national level (referred to as “Objective 2”) were completed 
in four of these countries (Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Mozambique and Pakistan).
This synthesis report presents the main findings from Objective 1 research, namely the VFM 
analysis of six DFID-funded WASH programmes. 
1.1 What is Value for Money and Value  
for Money analysis? 
The UK Department for International Development (DFID) defines Value for Money (VFM) as 
“maximising the impact of each pound spent to improve poor people’s lives” (DFID, 2011). This 
echoes the UK National Audit Office’s definition, which defines VFM as being “the optimal use  
of resources to achieve intended actual outcomes”. A key element in both definitions is to make  
the best use of available resources to achieve sustainable development outcomes.
VFM can be measured on the basis of a set of standard indicators, which can help programme 
implementers (and their funders) assess whether or not their programmes are making the best use  
of available resources. Answering this question is not an easy task: it requires conducting a “VFM 
analysis”, i.e. collecting and analysing data on the costs and results of the particular programme, 
interpreting the VFM indicators generated, and comparing them with those of other programmes. 
A qualitative assessment is needed to interpret the results from the VFM analysis, in order to better 
understand the context, the types of results and the processes by which these results were generated 
so as to be in a position to identify areas where changes in programme management could improve 
the overall performance of the programme.  
A key objective of conducting a VFM analysis is to help managers improve programme 
performance. It can give programme managers useful metrics to quantify the effects of challenges 
they observe on the ground and identify the best interventions to address them, including by the 
reallocation of resources. 
Conducting a VFM analysis is not necessarily about saving money and reducing unit costs: it is 
about maximising actual outcomes and impacts. Whilst the VFM of a programme could sometimes 
be improved by reducing the costs of certain inputs, greater and more sustainable actual outcomes 
can also be delivered by spending more on certain inputs. 
VFM analysis should consider key contextual elements of the programme: it is essential to gather as 
much information as possible on the operating conditions of the programme, its operating 
modalities and approaches. VFM analysis should be considered as a tool to be added to the essential 
toolbox of programme managers and evaluators rather than being considered as a stand-alone piece 
of analysis that replaces other evaluation tools.
The output of a VFM analysis should therefore not be just a series of quantitative indicators: the 
exercise in itself (and the associated discipline of computing comparable metrics) must engage with 
programme stakeholders in order to deliver learning.
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1.2 Research methodology
A research methodology was initially drafted and used to conduct the VFM analysis of programmes 
under review. It was further developed at the end of the research based on the experience of the 
team and reflected in a note entitled “How to do Value for Money analysis for WASH programmes” 
and available online at http://vfm-wash.org/category/publications.
In September 2013, the VFM-WASH project, jointly with DFID, identified focus countries and 
programmes interested to take part in the research, based on demand expressed by DFID country 
offices. The selection of programmes was designed to reflect a range of interventions across the 
WASH sector (covering water, sanitation and hygiene interventions at household level and in 
schools, mostly in development contexts but also to address humanitarian crises) and a spread of 
implementation arrangements (including through national programmes and government agencies, 
and international organisations such as UNICEF, and NGOs). Given the existing nature of DFID’s 
WASH portfolio, the majority of the programmes under review are operating in rural areas, albeit 
some also operated in small towns. 
The VFM analysis of DFID-funded programmes was carried out in a series of stages: 
• From September 2013 to June 2014, the research team conducted country visits and gathered data 
on expenditure and results of programmes. It conducted interviews with programme staff and sector 
stakeholders to better understand the programmes, identify what data was available (and in what 
form), and collect relevant documentation and reports, including any programme evaluations. 
• Interim reports based on preliminary results were presented to DFID and local partners between 
January and June 2014. These reports formulated recommendations to improve programme 
monitoring systems, particularly the tracking of inputs and results. They emphasised the need to 
strengthen tracking of outcomes over time, so as to provide a stronger basis for future VFM analysis. 
The reports also formulated programmatic recommendations for improving each programme’s 
VFM. Given that the majority of the programmes under review were already completed or were well 
under way with established implementation arrangements, the capacity for these reports to make an 
impact on programme implementation modalities was limited. However, findings have influenced 
the design of future programmes, for example, in Bangladesh and indirectly in Ethiopia. 
• From January to April 2015, the team conducted a second round of data collection in four 
countries to improve the level of detail of analysis, gather data for additional years or incorporate 
findings from Objective 2 surveys, particularly with respect to outcomes, given that outcome data 
was typically missing from standard monitoring systems. Additional research was conducted in 
Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Mozambique and Zambia.
In all countries, comparator programmes were identified so as to be able to compare VFM 
indicators of DFID-funded programmes with those of similar programmes in the same country. 
Where those programmes were interested in taking part in the research, we collected similar data 
and applied the same methodology to compute VFM indicators. Data was collected from the 
UNICEF One Million Initiative (OMI) in Mozambique, Community-Led Accelerated WASH 
(COWASH) in Ethiopia and World Vision in Zambia.
1.3 Report structure 
The present report is organised as follows: 
• Section 2 briefly summarises the conceptual framework used to conduct the VFM analysis  
of WASH programmes in the VFM-WASH project;
• Section 3 provides an overview of the programmes analysed, based on a number of key descriptors 
(type of programme, location, years, budget, grant recipient, implementing partners etc.);
• Section 4 presents key results of the VFM analysis of the programmes under review by type  
of programme component (access to water, sanitation promotion, hygiene promotion, etc.).  
It draws out illustrative results based on the five key dimensions of VFM (economy, efficiency, 
cost-efficiency, effectiveness, cost-effectiveness);
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Equity
Outputs
(e.g. facilities built, 
communities triggered, 
based on M&E systems)
Process
(e.g. borehole 
drilling, CLTS 
triggering)
Inputs
(capital, labour)
Costs
(£)
Sustained actual 
outcomes
(e.g. actual number 
of WASH service users 
as a result of project, 
based on baseline/
endline surveys)
Impacts
(e.g. improved 
health and education 
outcomes)
Assumed outcomes
(e.g. estimated number 
of beneficiaries based 
on assumptions)
Eciency Eectiveness
Cost-eectiveness
Cost-eciency
Economy
1  Based on a diagram from DFID’s WASH portfolio review (2012), amended by authors based on experience in projects 
examined and on literature review of this work in practice.
The results chain is composed of seven main elements: 
1 Costs – the financial costs of inputs;
2 Inputs – the resources used, in terms of finance and staff time (capital and labour);
3 Process – the process by which inputs are transformed into results. Such processes can be the object 
of a programme evaluation (which would be useful as a source of qualitative assessment) but cannot 
be quantified through VFM analysis; 
• Section 5 reflects on the VFM-WASH project findings to extract key lessons on using VFM analysis 
to improve programme management. The main emphasis in terms of learning has been placed on 
how VFM analysis can be used at the level of specific programmes and later, once a substantial set  
of comparable data becomes available, to draw comparisons across programmes; 
• Section 6 identifies the challenges that were met by the research team and formulates 
recommendations that aim to mainstream the use of VFM analysis in the WASH sector. They  
are targeted both at programme implementers (to help them improve data collection so as to 
facilitate VFM analysis) and at funders (to help promote a VFM culture within the sector).
In addition:
• Annex A includes a list of key references for this work.
2 Framework for VFM analysis
The analysis follows the standard methodology set out in the note “How to do Value for Money 
analysis for WASH programmes” and available online at http://vfm-wash.org/category/publications. 
2.1 Results chain and indicators
The VFM conceptual framework is based on a logical ‘results chain’, which explicitly sets out the 
results to be achieved by a given programme. Figure 1 below presents the main elements of this 
results chain and shows where the main dimensions of VFM can be measured.
Figure 1. The WASH results chain1
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Economy Eciency
Cost-
eciency
Cost-
eectiveness
Eectiveness
VFM
• How well have inputs been 
converted into outputs?
• Have planned outputs  
been achieved?
• If not, why not? What  
were key implementation  
challenges?
• Unit costs of key inputs?
• Were inputs bought at the right 
quality and right price? Do costs 
match to budget and those  
of other organisations?
• Efficiency of procurement?
• What are the programme costs per  
actual beneficiary over time?
• What are overall costs (to all parties)  
per actual beneficiary?
• How cost-effective have been efforts to 
increase equity (e.g. reaching the poor)?
• What are the costs per output 
(e.g. to build a water point,  
trigger one community)?
• What are equivalent costs  
per assumed beneficiary?
• How much funding was  
leveraged from other sources  
of finance?
• How effective has the programme in 
converting outputs into sustained 
actual outcomes?
• Are the services from the programme 
sustainable over time?
4 Outputs – the direct deliverables of the programme (number of water and sanitation facilities built, 
number of activities implemented such as CLTS triggering, etc.);
5 Assumed outcomes – resulting from the outputs, e.g. the number of beneficiaries assumed to have 
gained access to WASH services as a result of the outputs of the programme’s interventions. This 
can be based on existing standards and assumptions at country level, or based on lists of households;
6 Sustained actual outcomes – i.e. the actual change in poor people’s lives over time, such as the 
number of new people moving from using an unimproved water point to an improved one. The  
key difference with “assumed outcomes” is that “sustained actual outcomes” are measured based  
on household survey data before and after an intervention (e.g. 6, 12, 36 months after); i.e. based 
on the difference in key variables at baseline, endline and beyond. This captures the extent to which 
the outcomes have been achieved. Such data are only available if robust M&E and data collection 
frameworks are in place, which is seldom the case. Of the six programmes analysed by the VFM-
WASH project, only the SHEWA-B project in Bangladesh had gathered data on actual outcomes 
that could be used for the VFM analysis. With more than one post-intervention survey, it would be 
possible to explore the extent to which outcomes have been sustained over time.
7 Impacts – the longer-term impact of the WASH programme, including the impact on health and 
education, e.g. reduced diarrhoea, increased school attendance, and on poverty reduction, which is 
the ultimate intended impact of DFID programming.
Figure 1 represents a chain of events through time, given that these different types of results would 
usually, but not always, take place sequentially. The causal links between these different types of 
results needs to be informed by evidence, however, as a sustained actual outcome (in terms of people 
actually using WASH services) or an impact in the programme area may be influenced by factors 
outside the programme. 
Five key VFM dimensions can be analysed in the context of WASH programmes: economy, 
efficiency, cost-efficiency, effectiveness and cost-effectiveness. The analysis did not go beyond the 
outcome level as it was deemed too challenging to estimate the costs of reaching alternative impacts 
in the context of this project. Each of these dimensions is defined by a conceptual relationship 
between two of the elements in Figure 1, as shown by the arrows linking the different elements. 
Questions that need to be answered in order to characterise these five key dimensions are presented 
in Figure 2 below.
Figure 2. The five dimensions for assessing VFM of WASH programmes
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Table 1. Definitions of the five dimensions for assessing VFM of WASH programmes
Description Examples of indicators
Economy Economy relates to the price at which 
inputs are purchased (consultants, supply of 
goods, transport, training etc.). Assessing 
economy consists of evaluating whether the 
manager is buying inputs of the appropriate 
quality at the right price. Economy in 
procurement is important in WASH 
programmes where transport and goods can 
represent a high proportion of costs.
• Unit costs for key supplies
• Staff costs for different staff categories
Efficiency Efficiency relates to how well inputs are 
converted into a specific output, such as the 
construction of a water point, conducting  
a CLTS campaign, etc. The implementer 
exercises strong control over the quality  
and quantity of outputs that are produced.
% original targeted outputs achieved for 
budgeted amount 
% communities that have been declared 
ODF following CLTS ‘triggering’ 
Number of people living in communities 
that have been declared ODF following 
CLTS triggering 
Effectiveness Effectiveness relates to how well outputs 
from an intervention are converted into 
sustained actual outcomes. In contrast to 
outputs, the implementer does not exercise 
direct control over whether actual outcomes 
materialise and whether they can be 
sustained.
% of assumed outcomes translated into 
actual outcomes (i.e. assumed beneficiaries 
versus actual new users)
% new users still using the service  
at a sustained service level after  
three years
Cost-
efficiency
Cost-efficiency compares the costs of  
a WASH programme and the number of 
outputs and/or assumed outcomes reached. 
Cost efficiency would be expressed as cost 
per unit of output (or assumed outcome) 
generated.
Cost per output (cost per borehole,  
cost per CLTS triggering, etc.)
Cost per assumed beneficiary 
(i.e. assumed outcome)
Cost-
effectiveness
Cost-effectiveness is the cost of achieving 
intended programme actual outcomes (or 
impacts). This can be used to compare the 
costs of alternative ways of producing the 
same or similar outcomes.
Cost per actual beneficiary  
using sustainable WASH services  
(i.e. sustained actual outcome)
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The main adjustments to the WASH results chain compared to the one that appeared in the DFID 
WASH portfolio review (2012) are as follows:
• Distinguishing between assumed and actual outcomes: Many organisations make assumptions 
about outcomes based on outputs. For example, they assume that a new borehole will serve 250 
people. In practice, the new borehole might serve more or fewer people, depending on population 
density and how attractive the new facility is compared to the type of facility that people could 
access before. The distinction between assumed and actual outcomes was therefore introduced to 
reflect those factors. Actual outcomes can only be measured if robust M&E systems with ongoing 
data collection are in place. In particular, it is necessary to measure the number of new users who 
gain access to improved services that they did not have before. One way to express uncertainty 
resulting from a lack of data is to use ranges of estimates. 
• Taking sustainability and equity into consideration: Sustainability and equity are considered  
as an additional layer of analysis that cuts across the main VFM dimensions. These can, however,  
be incorporated into a VFM analysis when enough data are available. 
The sustainability of programme results can be considered when measuring effectiveness and 
cost-effectiveness, as both are based on “sustained actual outcomes”. Measuring sustained actual 
outcomes at different points in time will highlight the number of people who initially were using 
the WASH service (as measured through an endline survey after project completion), but later 
stopped using it for a variety of reasons (as measured by a second post-implementation survey some 
time later). The extent to which this captures longer-term sustainability depends on the timeframe 
for VFM analysis and on data availability. Ideally, such data would be gathered at least three years 
after the programme, to verify that results have effectively been sustained. However, the most likely 
scenario is that a VFM analysis will be done during the programme or shortly after it ends. This 
kind of VFM analysis cannot predict whether the service will be sustainable in the future, as this 
would depend on factors such as the extent and quality of associated software activities (capacity 
development/ training, etc.) and on ensuring that financing is available to undertake major repairs  
at a future date. 
Equity needs to be considered at several levels of the results chain, including at the level of inputs, 
outputs, outcomes and impacts. If sufficient data is available, this would mean conducting a 
standard VFM analysis for different groups. These groups can be defined in many ways, depending 
on how inequity manifests itself, i.e. through differences in income, gender or social groups (e.g. 
castes). In the present analysis, however, it was it was not possible to measure efficiency indicators 
across different social groups to consider equity as there was no sufficient data to do so.
For example, at the level of outputs, an equity analysis would examine the extent to which the 
programme has targeted outputs to address priorities in terms of improving equity, such as reducing 
the urban/rural divide or reaching hard-to-reach areas. A thorough understanding of the challenges 
associated with reaching specific targeted groups is essential to enable appropriate analysis of VFM 
findings; costs may be higher if a programme specifically targets communities living in hard-to-
reach areas but there may be very good reasons to spend more to address such inequities. In cost-
efficiency terms, it might be more advantageous to work in these areas as existing levels of service 
would probably be lower and the number of beneficiaries per investment may therefore be higher.
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2.2 Cost categories for VFM analysis
The VFM analysis included all expenditure that has contributed to achieving outputs and actual 
outcomes in a sustainable manner, including expenditure on relevant activities by actors outside  
the programme when they can be monetised (such as financial expenditure on staff costs, and 
contributions by governments or households). 
It is more straightforward to assess the VFM of a donor programme based on programme costs 
alone, when these costs are allocated by programme components. From a donor’s perspective, VFM 
analysis based on programme costs can be seen as more relevant, since it provides a direct assessment 
of the quantity of donor funds invested to achieve a given result. 
However, in programmes that seek to leverage significant funding from other sources (including 
government funding and household contributions), these additional contributions need to be 
included in order to derive the total costs of achieving those results and to provide a basis for 
comparisons with other programmes. 
Taking account of these other contributions also allows estimating a leverage ratio, the ratio  
of non-programme to programme costs (such as household contributions to programme costs).  
The leverage ratio can potentially be included in the VFM analysis as an indicator of cost-efficiency, 
as it measures the extent to which the programme has been able to leverage additional funding  
to achieve results.   
In programme-level reports and section 4 below, we have clearly identified whether non-programme 
contributions were estimated and how they were included in the analysis.
For the purpose of the analysis, costs were categorised by types of inputs, distinguishing between 
hardware, direct software support and indirect programme support (IPS) costs. These cost categories 
are further defined in Table 2 below.
Table 2. Programme cost categories
Type of costs Definitions
Direct hardware Initial capital costs and associated construction costs to put new services in place. 
Hardware investments include activities such as drilling, installing pumps and pipe 
systems, building latrines, etc., the costs of equipment and labour costs, and the one-off 
associated ‘software’ costs for detailed design studies and construction supervision.
Direct software 
support
Direct support activities associated with community mobilisation  
related to the outputs:
• CLTS campaigns; mobilisation, hygiene promotion
• Support and training to service providers
Indirect 
programme 
support
Cost of planning and implementing the activities of the programme. This includes  
the salaries of experts and programme support staff, as well as consultancies contracts, 
M&E studies and audits, trainings of technicians and goods (IT, equipment, etc.). The 
costs of programme staff or consultants directly engaged with hardware installation or 
direct software support would be allocated in those categories. In some cases, this may 
mean estimating the proportion of staff time spent on such activities
Source: Authors
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WSSP
Country: Ethiopia 
Actual expenditure: US$ 198 million 
DFID contribution: US$ 107 million 
Dates: 2008-2013 
Scale: National 
Sector: Rural Water, Sanitation  
and Hygiene 
Implementation: Gov. of Ethiopia
3 Overview of programmes analysed
This section provides a brief overview of the programmes that have been analysed by the VFM-
WASH project team, based on a number of key descriptors (type of programme, location, years, 
budget, grant recipient, implementing partners etc.). 
A more detailed presentation of the results for each programme can be found in a series of briefs 
presenting summary findings from the analysis of each programme and in the full summary reports, 
all of which are available at www.vfm-wash.org. Figure 3 below maps the programme reviewed.
Figure 3. Overview of WASH programmes analysed 3
SHEWA-B
Country: Bangladesh 
Actual expenditure: US$ 96 million 
DFID contribution: US$ 72 million 
Dates: 207-2013 
Scale: National 
Sector: Rural Water, Sanitation  
and Hygiene 
Implementation: UNICEF
SHAWN-I
Country: Nigeria 
Actual expenditure: US$ 55.3 million 
DFID contribution: US$ 45.7 million 
Dates: 2012-2013 
Scale: National – 4 states 
Sector: Rural Water, Sanitation and 
Hygiene 
Implementation: UNICEF
PRONASAR
Country: Mozambique 
Actual expenditure: US$ 65 million 
DFID contribution: US$ 34 million 
Dates: 2010-2015 (ongoing) 
Scale: National – in 3 provinces 
Sector: Rural Water and Sanitation 
Implementation: Gov. of  
Mozambique (DNA)
Common Fund
Country: Zambia 
Actual expenditure: US$ 32 million 
DFID contribution: US$ 29 million 
Dates: 2011-2016 (ongoing) 
Scale: National 
Sector: Rural Sanitation and Hygiene 
Implementation: UNICEF
Sanitation and Hygiene 
Programme
Response to Pakistan  
Floods 2010
Country: Pakistan 
Actual expenditure: US$ 26 million 
DFID contribution: US$ 26 million 
Dates: 2010-2013 
Scale: National 
Sector: Rural Water, Sanitation  
and Hygiene 
Implementation: NGOs: Save the 
Children, Oxfam, Mercy Corps,  
Islamic Relief, Handicap International, 
CONCERN, CARE with local  
partners, RSPN
2 Funding figures represent actual expenditure for completed programmes and budgets in the case of ongoing programmes.
3.1 SHEWA-B – Bangladesh
Programme overview. The Sanitation, Hygiene Education and Water Supply in Bangladesh 
(SHEWA-B) programme was a collaboration between the Government of Bangladesh (GoB),  
DFID and UNICEF. It was implemented over six years from 2007 to 2013.  Its goal was to reduce 
diarrhoeal disease and acute respiratory infection (the top two causes of post-natal under-five deaths 
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3 VFM analysis of these components was conducted in the main report but results were not included in the synthesis as this was  
   the only instance where this was done. 
4 US$ 17 million was spent on a wide range of evaluation and monitoring studies
in Bangladesh. Thus SHEWA-B had a strong programmatic focus on sanitation and hygiene 
behaviour change. Additional components included the provision of arsenic-free drinking water, 
school WASH, support to national policy development, and strengthening sub-national planning 
processes and implementation capacity.3 The programme targeted 60 rural upazilas (sub-districts) 
known to be at risk of arsenic contamination in groundwater and where poverty incidence was 
greater than 40%. It directly targeted 21.4 million people with hygiene promotion within the 
selected intervention areas, and indirectly targeted an additional 10 million people outside 
intervention areas, bringing the total number of targeted beneficiaries to 31.4 million.
The programme was implemented by UNICEF. Project support was channelled to GoB through 
the Department for Public Health Engineering (DPHE). Total programme expenditure was US$ 96 
million, of which DFID contributed US$ 72 million, DPHE US$ 16.3 million in direct 
contributions plus US$ 2 million in staff costs,  and UNICEF US$ 2.5 million. In addition, the 
programme leveraged US$ 66 million in household contributions. 
The programme was implemented at a historic moment as Bangladesh moved from one phase of 
WASH development (increasing basic access) to another (improving levels of service, sustainability 
and equity). The programme was subject to an almost-unprecedented degree of monitoring and 
evaluation.4 It included an impact evaluation conducted at the end of the programme in 2013, 
which included a detailed assessment of changes in hygiene behaviour in the programme areas. 
Scope of the VFM analysis. The VFM analysis was carried out after the programme had formally 
ended in 2013 and covered the 6 years of implementation (2007-2013). The analysis was able to 
examine key cost-effectiveness indicators associated with implementation of SHEWA-B and use 
these to identify potential improvements in subsequent programming in rural water supply and 
sanitation in Bangladesh. Specifically the VFM team provided input to the design of a results 
framework for a new DFID-supported intervention implemented by UNICEF and the 
Government of Bangladesh.
3.2 WSSP – Ethiopia
Programme overview. The Water Supply and Sanitation Programme (WSSP) was a government-
led programme to improve urban and rural WASH in Ethiopia. Phase 1 ran from 2004-2008 with 
US$ 116 million funding from the World Bank. Phase 2 was implemented between 2008 and 
2013, funded by DFID with a contribution of US$ 107 million, through a trust fund arrangement 
with the World Bank. The latter provided an additional credit of US$ 80 million in 2010. Overall 
Phase 2 disbursed about US$ 198 million. In addition, the government contributed to staff and 
indirect programme support costs.  
There were three components to WSSP, namely: i) Rural Water Supply and Sanitation, ii) Urban 
Water Supply and Sanitation and iii) Programme Support. The programme was designed to build 
the capacity of public and private stakeholders to plan, construct and maintain water supply and 
sanitation facilities. It aimed at building physical infrastructure such as hand-dug wells, boreholes, 
reticulated systems, and institutional and public latrines. The programme provided implementation 
support, including support for hygiene promotion. WSSP was operational in one third of woredas 
(districts) in Ethiopia, and provided access to improved water and sanitation to an estimated 5.1 
million people in urban and rural areas.
The programme was implemented jointly by the Ministry of Water, Irrigation and Energy, the 
Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Health at national level and regional and woreda (i.e. 
district) governments at local level. 
Scope of the VFM analysis. The VFM analysis was carried out after the programme had formally 
ended in 2013.  It focused on the investments made under WSSP Phase 2 (i.e. between 2008 and 
2013). It was not possible to separate DFID’s specific contribution, because all funding was referred 
to as “IDA/DFID” and went through government systems to the woredas and towns.
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3.3 PRONASAR Common Fund (CF)  
– Mozambique
Programme overview. PRONASAR (National Water Supply and Sanitation Programme) is a 
government-led programme to improve rural WASH in Mozambique. This multi-annual multi-
donor programme was established in 2009. Its initial objective was to provide access to improved 
water and sanitation facilities to 7.4 million rural inhabitants by 2015. The government of 
Mozambique (GoM) and development partners supported PRONASAR through two pillars.  
Pillar A supported specific programmes funded by different funders. Pillar B works through  
a Common Fund (CF) mechanism established in 2010 to pool funding from various donors.
The first phase of PRONASAR Common Fund was implemented by the government between 
January 2010 and March 2015. By the end of 2014, US$ 60.6 million had been disbursed by 
donors and the GoM to the PRONASAR CF from an initial budget of US$ 65 million. DFID  
was the main donor to the Common Fund contributing US$ 33.9 million.5 In the first phase,  
the Common Fund aimed to improve the quality and increase the coverage and sustainability  
of WASH services by providing hardware and software support in 15 districts in three priority 
provinces (Maputo, Gaza and Zambezia) for the construction of water points, the construction  
and rehabilitation of small piped water schemes and sanitation promotion activities. The first phase 
of the programme aimed to improve access to water for 537,000 people and access to sanitation  
for 145,000 people. It also provided technical assistance and training in all of the other provinces.  
A second phase has been agreed in principle and planning is currently under way.
Scope of the VFM analysis. The VFM analysis was carried out while activities were still being 
implemented. It focused on investments made between 2011 and 2014 through the PRONASAR 
Common Fund (Pillar B). It was not possible to separate out DFID’s specific contribution from 
other expenditure going through the Common Fund, as they are not separately tracked.
3.4 SHAWN – Nigeria
Programme overview. The Sanitation, Hygiene and Water in Nigeria (SHAWN) Programme is 
funded by DFID and implemented by UNICEF Nigeria. The first phase (referred to as SHAWN-I) 
ran from 2010 to 2013. It aimed to accelerate progress in latrine usage, adoption of improved 
handwashing practices and consumption of safe water for 2.3 million people. It had four main 
components: sanitation and hygiene promotion; water; deployment of resources at state and local 
government levels to enable scaling up state-wide access to WASH services; and capacity building  
of government staff. It initially covered 12 Local Government Authorities (LGAs), with eight more 
added in December 2011, making a total of 20 LGAs. 
SHAWN-I disbursed about US$ 55.3 million between March 2010 and November 2013, of which 
US$ 45.7 million came from DFID. Co-funding came from UNICEF and the government of 
Nigeria. Programme funds were disbursed through UNICEF Nigeria but LGAs were in charge  
of implementation in an effort to increase the potential for sustainability and scale-up after the 
programme ends. The implementation of the second phase (referred as SHAWN-II) is currently 
under way (from August 2013 to November 2018) with a total budget of US$ 150 million).
Scope of the VFM analysis. The VFM analysis was carried out after the programme had formally 
ended in 2013. It covered the investments made during the whole duration of SHAWN-I (2010-
2013) but it was not possible to track VFM variations between years. The VFM analysis focused  
on the first two components of the SHAWN-I programme: sanitation and hygiene on the one hand, 
and water on the other. The two other components were treated as indirect programme support.
5 Other contributors to the Common Fund have included the Government of Mozambique, the Dutch Government via its 
Embassy, the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation, UNICEF and the Austrian Development Agency.
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3.5 Response to 2010 floods – Pakistan
Programme overview. In Pakistan, funding to address the humanitarian crisis following from the 
2010 floods was analysed. Flooding started in July 2010 as a result of heavy monsoon rains in all 
four of the main provinces in Pakistan, and resulted in widespread inundation all along the main 
stem of the Indus River, and some of its tributaries. The floods affected more than 20 million 
people in an estimated 11,000 villages throughout Pakistan. Sindh province was hit especially hard.
DFID coordinated its WASH relief efforts by supporting nine different organisations that received a 
combined total of more than US$ 26 million to implement WASH emergency and recovery 
interventions in areas affected by floods. The type of intervention varied but included rehabilitation 
of water supply and sanitation infrastructure, provision of drinking water through tanker trucks and 
handpumps, construction of household and communal latrines, the distribution of hygiene kits and 
water treatment tablets, hygiene education and training of local staff. 
Scope of the VFM analysis. The VFM analysis focused on activities undertaken between 2010 and 
2012 in the Sindh province, which was a principal programme area for the DFID response. VFM 
data was collected and analysed for three NGOs active in the humanitarian response and working 
on WASH in Sindh, namely Care, Islamic Relief and Mercy Corps. 
3.6 Zambia Sanitation and Hygiene 
Programme (ZSHP) – Zambia
Programme overview. The Zambia Sanitation and Hygiene Programme (ZSHP) is a programme 
funded by DFID and being implemented by UNICEF-Zambia between November 2011 and 
March 2016. It aims to accelerate progress in latrine use and improve handwashing practices  
by targeting 3 million people and 500,000 school children in 1,000 schools in 67 districts. The 
programme is a component of Zambia’s National Rural Water Supply and Sanitation Programme 
(NRWSSP), and is complemented by additional investments in rural WASH by the Ministry of 
Local Government and Housing (MoLGH), the African Development Bank, and the Millennium 
Challenge Corporation, among other national and international organisations. The ZSHP is the 
largest programme of its kind in Zambia that focuses exclusively on rural sanitation and hygiene. 
The ZSHP encompasses several activities including (1) ‘Community Approaches to Total 
Sanitation’ (CATS), where community facilitators engage with people to end open defecation 
through sensitisation and collective action to build and use toilets; (2) institutional sanitation, 
through which appropriate sanitation facilities in schools are built, and a complementary hygiene 
promotion strategy and school-based management system are developed;6 (3) a communication  
and hygiene promotion strategy, using both interpersonal communication and mass media;  
and (4) sanitation marketing.
The total programme budget is US$ 32 million, of which US$ 21 million have been spent up to  
the end of 2014. DFID is contributing a total of US$ 29 million over the life of the programme. 
For implementation, UNICEF has partnered with nine NGOs (Afya Mzuri, Akros, CIDRZ, Plan 
International, SNV, Varen, Village Water, WaterAid and World Vision), which act as facilitators  
at the district level.
Scope of the VFM analysis. The VFM analysis was carried out while the programme was still 
being implemented. It covers the period from 2012 to 2014 and focusses on CATS and institutional 
sanitation, as these are the main programme components.7
6 Sanitation facilities for schools are gender-segregated (with a ratio of 50 children per latrine) and have a handwashing facility  
   nearby (with water and cleansing agents available) that allow more than one child to wash their hands at the same time. At least  
   one sanitation facility is also equipped with hand bars for disabled children. 
7 The institutional sanitation component also covers the first half of 2015.
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4 Summary of key findings from  
the VFM analysis
This section presents key results of the VFM analysis of the programmes under review, presented  
by type of programme component (access to water, sanitation promotion, hygiene promotion, etc.). 
It draws out illustrative results based on the five key dimensions of VFM (economy, efficiency, 
cost-efficiency, effectiveness and cost-effectiveness). 
The purpose of this section is to illustrate the type of information that has emerged from  
the analysis conducted during the project and to set out how such findings can be relevant for 
programme managers and funders. This section is based on detailed analysis done at country level, 
which has been captured in programme-level reports available at www.vfm-wash.org. Sections 4  
and 5 go further in extracting learning points from the project, particularly in terms of how  
VFM analysis can support management decisions (Section 4) and what the implications  
are in terms of improving the functioning of monitoring systems (Section 5). 
Results are presented here by main programmatic components (i.e. water, sanitation, hygiene 
promotion and WASH in schools) so as to facilitate understanding within a particular area of 
activity. However, there are important interactions between components in most programmes  
which also need to be taken into consideration when looking at the results and seeking to assess  
the VFM of an overall programme. Some expenditure, such as social mobilisation, often contributes  
to both water and sanitation and/or sanitation and hygiene components. 
VFM indicators calculated for each programme are presented at the beginning of each section. They 
are not intended to be compared across countries for a number of reasons: they were calculated for 
different years, outputs may not be exactly identical and costs vary according to location and to the 
programme implementation status.8 Such comparisons are more relevant when they are carried out 
within the same country (comparisons between programme modalities and implementers) or within 
the same programme across the years. However, international comparisons can be drawn in terms of 
efficiency, effectiveness or in terms of cost breakdown between international programmes. In order 
to allow comparability across countries, VFM indicators were calculated using the actual expenditure 
associated with each result in local currency. These figures were then converted into US$ using 
official exchange rates from the World Bank database.9
4.1 Water supply at household level 
Five programmes conducted activities related to the provision of water supply at household level.  
By contrast, the ZSHP in Zambia focused exclusively on sanitation and hygiene.
These activities mostly consisted of constructing or rehabilitating water points, mainly in rural 
areas. PRONASAR CF in Mozambique also built small piped schemes in small towns and WSSP  
in Ethiopia built water supply systems in small, medium and large sized towns. In the majority  
of cases, the programmes funded public water points, except in the case of Bangladesh, where 
households also invested in private water supply solutions following social mobilisation activities 
funded by the programme. 
Water services were provided through a variety of technological solutions, including: 
• Springs and hand-dug wells, 
• Shallow and deep tubewells or boreholes fitted with handpumps or motorised pumps, and 
8 The summary tables of VFM indicators do not present the nuanced detail and analysis underlying these figures, for reasons  
   of space. The detail can be seen in the full country reports which are available at www.vfm-wash.org. Variation in data  
   availability and quality means that indicators are not usually directly comparable between countries. 
9  For annual cost per result indicators, yearly exchange rates were used. For average cost per result indicators over several years, 
the average of annual exchange rates over the same years was used.
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• Piped network systems (the latter are referred to as Small Water Supply Systems (SWSS)  
in Mozambique and rural piped schemes (RPS) in Ethiopia). 
These investments were carried out in a range of hydrogeological contexts, including deep  
and shallow groundwater, and with a range of water quality constraints, including the presence  
of arsenic in groundwater supplies in Bangladesh. 
Table 3 below presents in more detail the main characteristics of the water activities for each  
of the programmes under review. 
Table 3. Water supply activities – programmes’ characteristics
Bangladesh Ethiopia Mozambique Nigeria Pakistan
SHEWA-B WSSP PRONASAR CF SHAWN-I Response to 2010 
Floods
Activities • Social 
mobilisation and 
promotion of 
household 
investment in 
arsenic-safe water 
points
• Construction and 
rehabilitation of 
public water points
• Construction of 
public water 
points in rural 
areas and support 
to urban water 
systems
• Training of 
Woreda Water 
Teams etc.
• Construction  
of public water 
points
• Construction  
and rehabilitation 
of small piped 
water schemes
• Construction  
and rehabilitation 
of public water 
points
• Village-Level 
Operation and 
Maintenance 
system (VLOM)
• Construction  
of public water 
points
• Water trucking to 
displaced peoples
• Distribution  
of Aqua tabs
Type of water 
infrastructure 
constructed
• Public water 
points: mainly 
deep tubewells 
but also pond 
sand filters and 
piped systems
• Private water 
points: mainly 
shallow tubewells
• A wide range  
of rural schemes 
(including few 
rural piped 
schemes)
• Small-town water 
supply systems
• Public water 
points (mainly 
HPBH) 
• Piped SWSS  
with individual 
connections and 
public standpipes
Public water points 
–handpump fitted  
boreholes (HPBH) 
and motorised 
boreholes (MBH)
• Public water 
points – boreholes 
and handpumps
Average  
number of users 
per output 
constructed
• Deep tubewells  
96 (assumed),  
104 (actual)
• Shallow tubewells 
4.5 (assumed)
• Springs: 350 
(assumed)
• Hand-dug wells; 
270 (assumed)
• Shallow drilled 
wells: 500 
(assumed)
• Water points:  
300 (assumed)
• SWSS: 6,173 
(actual)
• Water points: 
47-779 (assumed 
– derived based 
on the actual 
number of 
persons living in 
the community)
• Water points  
81 – 96 (actual)
Hydrogeological 
context
• Groundwater  
and surface water 
abundant but 
arsenic 
contamination is  
a risk in shallow 
aquifers.
• Large variation, 
with groundwater 
occurrence 
extremely spatially 
variable and 
seasonal surface 
water flows
• Various, but 
mostly arid and 
high reliance on 
groundwater
• Variable 
groundwater 
depth and 
seasonal surface 
water flows
• Highly seasonal 
surface water 
flows; saline 
ground water  
in coastal areas
Implementer • DPHE (public 
tubewells)
• Local NGOs 
(social 
mobilisation)
• Regional and 
woreda (district) 
governments
• Provinces with 
districts
• UNICEF, private 
contractors, LGA 
WASH 
departments
• Care, Islamic 
Relief, Mercy 
Corps
Sources of 
funding*
• Programme, 
government  
(staff time) and 
households 
(direct 
investment) 
• Programme, 
government (staff 
time and IPS) and 
household 
contributions (in 
kind)
• Programme, 
government  
(staff time)
• Programme, 
government 
(counterpart 
funding), and 
household 
contributions
• Programme only
* Bold highlights show expenditure that has been disaggregated and included in VFM analysis.
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Table 4 below presents the main VFM indicators calculated for water supply activities.
Table 4. Summary of VFM indicators for water supply activities
(*) The types of public water points varied widely, ranging from tubewells/boreholes in Mozambique 
and Nigeria and a range of technologies including a few piped schemes in Bangladesh and Ethiopia. 
(**) Due to uncertainty about the prevalence of arsenic in private water points, the costs per person 
gaining access to arsenic-safe water can only be expressed as a range.
Bangladesh 
SHEWA-B
Ethiopia 
WSSP
Mozambique 
PRONASAR CF
Nigeria 
SHAWN-I
Pakistan 
Response to 2012 
Floods
2008-2014 2008-2013 2012-2014 2010-2013 2010-2011
Efficiency
Water points constructed: actual vs targets 100% 100% 81% – 96%–102%
Cost-efficiency
Total cost per new public water point* US$ 1,223 – US$ 23,755 US$ 7,989 US$ 184–601*
Hardware cost US$ 993 (81%) – US $14,606 (61%) US$ 5,264 (66%)
US$ 135–434 (~73%)
Software cost
US$ 230 (19%)
– US$ 1,582 (7%) US $58 (1%)
Indirect programme support – US$ 7,567 (32%) US$ 2,667 (33%) US$ 49–168 (~17%)
Total cost per new private water point US$ 126 – – – –
Hardware cost – – – – –
Software cost US$ 108 (86%) – – – –
Indirect programme support US$ 20 (14%) – – – –
Total cost per person who gained  
access to a new public water point 
(Programme cost only)
US$ 21 US$ 27 US$ 79 US$31 US$ 4–6
Hardware cost US$ 16 (76%)
US$ 25 (93%)
US $49 (61%)
US$ 19 (62%) US$ 3–4 (~73%)
Software cost US$ 2 (10%) US $5 (7%)
Indirect programme support US$ 3 (14%) US$ 3 (7%) US$ 25 (32%) US$ 12 (38%) US$ 2–3 (~17%)
Total cost per person who gained access 
to a new public water point (including 
household contribution)
US$ 33 – – – –
Total cost per person who gained access 
to a new private arsenic- safe water point 
(programme cost only)
US$ 29–136** – – – –
Total cost per person who gained access 
to a new private arsenic- safe water point 
(including household contribution)cost 
per person
US$ 80–380** – – – –
Total cost per person who gained access 
to a new arsenic safe water point (both 
public and private, programme cost only)
US$ 22–26** – – – –
Cost-effectiveness (actual average costs paid)
Total cost per person who gained access 
to a water point (both public and private) 
and uses it (Programme cost only)
US$ 27–32
–
US$ 132
– –Hardware cost US$ 15–18 (76%)
–Software cost US$ 8–9 (12%)
Indirect programme support US$ 4–53 (12%)
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4.1.1 Economy
For water supply, “economy” assesses whether inputs, including physical supplies for water point 
construction (e.g. cement or handpumps) and staff inputs, were purchased at the appropriate 
quality and at the right price. However, only two programmes – both implemented by UNICEF 
– comprehensively monitored the costs of water construction contracts: namely SHAWN-I in 
Nigeria and SHEWA-B in Bangladesh, as outlined in Box 1 and Box 2 below. For the remaining 
three programmes, qualitative information was used to assess the economy dimension of VFM at 
the level of input costs. For example, in Ethiopia, we found that there was high inflation during the 
programme (23% on average annually), causing dramatic increases in construction and labour costs 
and requiring an additional IDA credit in 2010, but no qualitative data was available to assess the 
specific impact on programme costs.
Whilst installing a handpump-fitted borehole (HPBH) appears roughly twice as expensive in 
Nigeria than in Bangladesh, it is important to note that these figures are taken from different 
contexts. Handpumps are cheaper in Bangladesh as they are manufactured locally, whereas in most 
African countries they are imported.
Box 1. Cost of water point construction contracts in Bangladesh (SHEWA-B)
The cost of developing water points is 
strongly driven by external factors, relating to 
hydrological and hydrogeological conditions 
that affected the choice of the technology. In 
Bangladesh, contamination of shallow aquifers 
with arsenic is a major concern. The prolonged 
ingestion of arsenic, even in very small 
quantities, results in serious health outcomes 
ranging from skin lesions to cancers. The 
incidence of arsenic however is unpredictable 
and varies with time and hydrogeological factors. 
In some areas, arsenic-safe water can be reliably 
produced from deep aquifers. As shown in the 
figure on the right, the exploitation of deep 
aquifers is more expensive than for shallow 
aquifers due to the increased costs of drilling  
and more expensive pumps being needed to raise 
water to the surface. Cost also varies depending 
on geological conditions, which drive the costs 
of drilling. Where deep aquifers cannot be 
exploited, surface water systems must be used.  
In a small number of locations, small water 
networks using surface sources are the best 
option. This means that the unit capital costs  
of public water points vary widely. 
Figure 4. Average unit capital costs of water 
points technologies: SHEWA-B Water Points10 
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10  Data source: WaterAid/HDRC unit costs report was for the ASEH project (Advancing Sustainable Environmental Health), 
from 2003 to 2009. The average hardware costs of SHEWA-B water points per technology have been calculated by HDRC as 
part of the VFM study prepared for SHEWA-B. These data were assembled by assessing financial records.
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Box 2. Costs of water point construction contracts in Nigeria (SHAWN-I)
SHAWN-I monitored the total costs of water 
point drilling based on construction contracts 
(but did not monitor the costs of specific  
inputs, such as cement, etc.).
The figure on the right shows that actual costs 
were consistently lower than budgeted, due  
to competition between multiple qualified 
contractors at bidding stage. In addition, costs 
stated in contracts were sometimes higher than 
those paid, because water points did not need  
to be drilled as deep as planned. Costs varied 
slightly between regions, due to differences in 
drilling depths, but they were still comparable  
to other organisations active in the water sector 
in Nigeria. WaterAid cited US$ 5,690 for 
hardware costs of HPBH construction, 
compared to US$ 5,264 for the average 
contractor under SHAWN (WaterAid,  
personal communication, January 2014).
Figure 5. Budgeted and actual costs  
for Handpump-fitted borehole (HPBH) 
construction for SHAWN-I – by regions
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4.1.2 Efficiency and cost-efficiency 
Efficiency. Assuming that plans and budgets have been appropriately drawn up (i.e. that they reflect 
realistic and sufficiently ambitious objectives) and expenditure is in line with budgets, meeting 
planned targets can be used as a proxy indicator of efficiency. In four out of five programmes with  
a water component, data on the number of water points planned and constructed was available.  
The realisation rate for water point construction ranged between 80% and 100%, with programmes 
in Ethiopia and Pakistan performing well (around 100%) and Mozambique less well (81%). 
Variations in achievement rates were affected by several factors:
• Contracting and funding delays – In Mozambique, disbursement of funds to PRONASAR CF 
has been unpredictable, slow and often late. This led to delays in the contracting of construction 
companies and thus in output realisation. In Nigeria, delays in contracting resulted from delays in 
securing government counterpart funding. In Ethiopia, implementers received budget allocations 
late from higher levels of administration (regions from MoFED and woredas from regions), which 
resulted in procurement delays and a mismatch between funding availability and appropriate  
timing for construction. Budgets were received just before the rainy season, when water points 
cannot be constructed.
• Changes in pre-conditions for water provision – In Nigeria, realisation rates for water point 
construction were initially low because water points could only be constructed in ODF villages  
(and achieving ODF status can take time). When this pre-condition was lifted half way through  
the programme, the number of water points constructed per year increased. Whereas no water 
points had been constructed prior to January 2012, 627 water points had been constructed  
by September 2012 and 3,808 by December 2013.   
• Technical drilling issues – In Mozambique, the realisation rate for water points dropped to 73%  
in 2013 but improved over time (81% on average throughout the life of the programme). Technical 
difficulties were encountered with drilling, due to complex hydrogeological conditions, which 
required a change in technology. 
• Hydrological factors – In Bangladesh, the main driver for efficiency was the extent to which new 
tubewells yielded water that met the required standards for arsenic contamination.  In the case of 
public tubewells, the rate of arsenic contamination was low (0.3% of contaminated tubewells) in 
Analysing the Value for Money of DFID-funded WASH programmes – Synthesis report  |  © Oxford Policy Management  |  17
part because public tubewells can be drilled to deeper depths where the aquifer is less affected by 
arsenic. There was some uncertainty about the prevalence of arsenic in private tubewells constructed 
by the programme, which means that efficiency rates could only be estimated within a range 
between lower- and upper-bound estimates for rates of arsenic using data on arsenic contamination 
from a survey in SHEWA-B communities (between 0.3% and 79%).
• Other external factors – In Mozambique, flooding of the Zambezi River and political turmoil in 
2013 affected delivery of outputs. The realisation rate of water point construction dropped from 
77% in 2012 to 72% in 2013, but then increased to 93% in 2014.
Cost-efficiency. The average total cost for providing access to a new public water point, over the 
life of each programme, ranged between US$ 4-6 per person in Pakistan to US$ 79 per person in 
Mozambique for a range of water point technologies and it averaged US$ 194 per person gaining 
access to a small piped scheme in Mozambique. These costs included the costs of construction 
contracts, supervision contracts, community mobilisation and indirect programme support (IPS). 
Yet, it is important to note that it was not possible to include all IPS costs for all programmes  
(in particular, it was difficult to precisely estimate the value of IPS costs borne by the government). 
Thus, IPS is likely to be under-estimated in Ethiopia and Mozambique, but to be overestimated  
in Nigeria. Values also include households’ contributions for Bangladesh, but not for Nigeria, 
Mozambique and Ethiopia as the latter could not be estimated in those cases (often because in-kind  
or cash contributions recommended by the programmes could not be monitored and probably were 
not made in reality, or were only made to cover O&M costs, as in Ethiopia and Mozambique).
It is important to note that cost-efficiency indicators are not intended to be directly compared 
between programmes, as costs vary depending on the type of technology, hydrological and  
socio-political context, as explained in the section above on economy.
The cost per person who gained access to a new water point can greatly vary depending on the 
method used for evaluating the number of users per water point. It was only in Bangladesh and 
Pakistan that beneficiary numbers were based on household survey data from baseline and endline 
surveys, whereas in Ethiopia, Mozambique and Nigeria the number of users per water point  
was assumed based on infrastructure types or the number of people living in a service area.  
If assumptions regarding the number of beneficiaries per water point change, as happened in 
Mozambique and Nigeria during the life of the programmes under review, this can drastically 
improve or worsen the cost-efficiency per person over time, without any real change in actual  
service levels. 
The cost-efficiency of building water points is affected by contracting conditions. In Nigeria, 
Ethiopia, Bangladesh and Mozambique a performance-based contract was used that specified  
that contractors were only paid when a tubewell/borehole yields water (i.e. the contractor hits  
the aquifer). This arrangement may have resulted in an efficient translation of inputs into outputs. 
However, the impact on cost of water points cannot be assessed as the additional expenditure  
for drilling unsuccessful tubewell/borehole would be borne by the contractors rather than the 
programme, but would likely result in higher prices per tubewell/borehole as contractors build  
in the risk. Alternatively, the contractor could be paid when the water point continues to yield  
water over time.
Collecting annual cost efficiency data for a specific programme allows monitoring of VFM trends 
overtime. It was only in Mozambique that sufficient data was available to estimate annual cost-
efficiency indicators and therefore, track variations in cost-efficiency.13 Here, we found that the  
cost per person decreased over time (see Box 3 over the page). These figures make a strong case  
for demonstrating the improvements of PRONASAR CF’s performance over time.
11 This is because in Nigeria it was not possible to attribute general capacity building initiatives to specific components  
     and therefore, to exclude IPS costs that should have been allocated to activities out of the scope of VFM analysis. 
12 In Nigeria, households were required to match 3-5% of donor funding for hardware costs and were encouraged to put  
     aside 2.5% of hardware costs as a fund for operation and maintenance (O&M) – though data was not available on how  
     much of this was secured. 
13 Annual data was also available for Ethiopia, but it was not possible to draw conclusions from it because the allocation of  
     outputs to specific years was not accurate in the monitoring system.  Costs in year t might have been related to outputs  
     in year t+1, for example.
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Box 3. Annual variations in cost per water point for PRONASAR CF – Mozambique
The analysis found that the 
average cost per water point 
constructed (estimated over a 
one-year period) decreased by 
35% between 2012 and 2014, 
mainly due to a reduction in the 
cost of hardware.14 This could  
be explained by improvements 
in procurement performance, a 
change in the characteristics of 
outputs (depth of boreholes) or 
by use of lower cost technology.
Figure 6. Cost per water point for  
PRONASAR CF
Indirect Programme  
Support cost
Planned total cost per output
Direct software support cost
Actual total cost per output  
(in real terms)
Hardware capital cost
Source: Estimates by authors from PRONASAR  
PIA and Relatorio Balanço data for 2012 to 2014
4.1.3 Effectiveness and cost-effectiveness
Effectiveness and cost-effectiveness assess how water point construction translates into people having 
sustained access to water and actually using the water source. A key difference with measuring 
efficiency and cost-efficiency is that these indicators take account of the actual number of people 
using a facility, preferably after a few years of service, as opposed to an assumed number of people  
at the time of construction. However, getting these numbers requires having access to robust 
monitoring data. Only the SHEWA-B programme in Bangladesh collected data on the actual 
number of beneficiaries using water points at the end of the programme. 
Effectiveness of water point construction can be affected by a number of factors: 
• Water points continuing to function overtime, which depends on adequate maintenance (including 
spare part availability) and hydrological factors (affecting water availability and quality); 
• Water points being effectively used by local users over time. 
Effectiveness needs to be monitored in terms of marginal changes over baseline conditions. In 
Bangladesh, baseline water access in the programme intervention areas was high, so although new 
water points were built, this may not have resulted in people moving from using ‘unimproved’ to 
‘improved’ sources. Instead, it may have improved service levels (e.g. by improving accessibility, 
reliability and predictability of access and reducing times for water collection) for households  
that were already using ‘improved’ sources (see Box 4 opposite).
14  Data for 2011 was excluded from the calculation of the average cost per water point as the quality of output data was 
questionable
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Box 4. Methodological challenges with estimating the effectiveness and cost-effectiveness 
of water interventions in SHEWA-B – Bangladesh
Medium-long term outcomes for water interventions in SHEWA-B are determined by a number  
of factors over the life cycle of the facilities. These include:
•  Water point functionality: DPHE surveillance systems estimate that 85% of public deep 
tubewells remain in service after six years. To calculate cost effectiveness, it was assumed that 
private water points remained functional at the same rate as public water points. 
•  Arsenic status of water points: as mentioned above, public tubewells had a low rate of arsenic 
contamination (0.3% of contaminated tubewells), whereas there was no data on the prevalence  
of arsenic in private tubewells constructed by the programme (which was estimated between 
0.3% and 79% based on secondary sources). Thus cost effectiveness for arsenic-safe water  
could be calculated for public water points, but had to be calculated as a range using lower-  
and upper-bound contamination estimates for private water points. 
•  Reach of public water points: DPHE assumes a household usage rate of 14 families for public 
water points. Anecdotal evidence suggests that public water points often serve fewer families due  
to processes of social exclusion and increased use of private tubewells. In fact, Objective 2 data  
from sustainability surveys suggested a slightly higher number of users of public water points  
than the baseline assumption; an average of 104 users which equates to 23 families.  
•  Missing baseline data: Finally, there was limited data available on the levels of access to drinking 
water before the programme began which means that it is difficult to identify specifically those 
people who gained access to higher levels of service as a result of the project. In the absence of 
detailed data, the best that can be said currently is that the number of people having access to 
more convenient and reliable sources and making use of those safer sources for drinking as a 
result of the SHEWA-B programme is uncertain. At a maximum it could be 1.2 million but in 
theory it could even be zero (if everyone had access to an arsenic-safe source before the project).
•  Taking these uncertainties into account, the actual programme cost per person who gained access  
to a public water point and was using it at the end of the project is US$ 25. The programme  
cost per person who gained access to a private water point and was using it was estimated  
to lie between US$ 34 and US$ 160.
Figure 7. Cost-effectiveness – Cost per person who gained access to an arsenic-safe water 
point and uses it
Key: LB – lower-bound estimate assuming lower rates of arsenic contamination; UB – upper-bound estimate assuming higher rates of arsenic 
contamination;
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In the absence of such programme-level data, cost-effectiveness could only be estimated based on 
complementary data. In Mozambique, results from the Objective 2 sustainability survey were used  
to assess the number of actual users per water point and their functionality as a basis for estimating 
the effectiveness and cost-effectiveness of water points constructed. Functionality of water points 
was estimated at 92% in the three CF provinces and the number of actual users per water point  
was estimated at 194 (as opposed to the assumed number of people served by the programme, 
which was initially set at 500 people per water point and later revised down to 300). Using these 
assumptions for PRONASAR CF, the cost per actual water point user was estimated at US$ 132, 
which is 56% higher than the cost per person based on programme assumptions about how  
many people would gain access to a new water point. 
4.2 Sanitation
All of the six programmes reviewed included a sanitation component, yet data was only available  
for four countries (excluding Ethiopia and Pakistan).
All programmes in Sub-Saharan Africa included a CLTS component, with triggering activities 
conducted by NGOs with the objective of eliminating open defecation. Programmes in Zambia  
and Nigeria also included hygiene promotion activities. In addition, the Zambia programme  
funded sanitation marketing activities. 
SHEWA-B in Bangladesh took a different approach. It primarily used local social mobilisation 
teams, Community Hygiene Promoters (CHPs), working with households and running tea  
and market sessions to promote household investment in hygienic latrines. The programme also 
provided a very small number of subsidies for ultra-poor households to build latrines. Most of the 
intervention areas had already been exposed to community-led total sanitation-type triggering and 
the rate of open defecation was already relatively low, so the programme focused on promoting  
the use of hygienic latrines rather than on eliminating open defecation.
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Bangladesh 
SHEWA-B
Mozambique 
PRONASAR CF
Nigeria 
SHAWN-I
Zambia 
ZSHP
Activities • Social mobilisation for 
household investment 
in latrines
• Minimal procurement 
of sanitation hardware 
for ultra-poor and 
hard-to-reach areas
• CLTS, including 
hygiene promotion
• CLTS in schools
CLTS, including hygiene 
promotion
• CLTS in communities 
and legal enforcement 
of public health 
legislation 
• Development of 
national sanitation and 
hygiene policies & 
support to the  National 
Rural Water Supply and 
Sanitation Programme
• Sanitation marketing
Context • High rates of prior 
exposure to CLTS or 
similar social 
mobilisation techniques
• Rapidly declining rate 
of open defecation 
during the programme 
period
• Availability of 
experienced masons and 
materials 
• Low access to improved 
sanitation in target 
districts (2%–31%)
• Low access to improved 
sanitation  in target 
states : 11%–41% 
(MICS 2011)
• Low access to improved 
sanitation  in target 
districts (8% in 2013)
Type of 
sanitation 
facilities 
constructed
• Various pit latrines, 
most of which had 
permanent slabs and 
were ‘improved’
• Traditional, traditional 
improved and improved 
latrines
• Unimproved and 
improved latrines at 
community-level
• Traditional improved 
and improved latrines  
at community-level
Implementer • DPHE with local 
NGOs
• Provinces with districts • UNICEF, partner 
NGOs, LGA WASH 
departments
• UNICEF, partner 
NGOs, District 
Councils
Sources of 
funding*
• Programme with 
co-funding from 
national sanitation 
subsidy programme and 
household 
contributions.
• Programme (for CLTS 
campaigns)
• Households for latrine 
construction
• Programme (UNICEF 
and government)
• Households for latrine 
construction
• UNICEF Programme 
funds, NGOs, 
government, and 
households (for the 
construction of 
sanitation facilities)
(*) expenditure included in VFM indicators is highlighted in bold
Table 5 below presents the main characteristics of the sanitation activities for each programme  
in more detail.
Table 5. Sanitation activities – programmes’ characteristics
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Bangladesh 
2008-2014 
SHEWA-B
Mozambique 
2011-2014 
PRONASAR CF
Nigeria 
2010-2013 
SHAWN-I
Zambia 
2012-2014 
ZSHP
Efficiency
Communities triggered by CLTS: actual versus target – 147% – –
Communities certified / verified as ODF: actual 
versus target
– 55%* 165% 108%
New latrines constructed : actual versus target 100% 175% – –
ODF conversion rate (number of ODF  
verified communities over the total number  
of communities that were triggered by CLTS)
– 10%–16%** 39% 22%
Cost-efficiency
Cost per community triggered by CLTS – US$ 4,035** – –
Hardware cost – – – –
Software cost – US$ 2,998** (74%) US$ 1,338 –
Indirect programme support – US$ 1,037**(26%) – –
Cost per community certified / verified as ODF – US$ 11,941** US$ 5,668 US$ 1,584
Hardware cost 
–
– – US$ 142 (9%)
Software cost US$ 7,431** (62%) US$ 2,732 (48%) US$ 1,228 (78%)
Indirect programme support US$ 4,510**(38%) US$ 2,936 (52%) US$ 215 (13%)
Cost per person living in a certified 
ODF community (programme only)
US$ 3715 – US$ 17 –
Hardware cost – – – –
Software cost – – US$ 5.5(32%) –
Indirect programme support – – US$ 11.6 (68%) –
Cost per new sanitation facility construction 
(programme only)
US$ 20 – – –
Hardware cost (programme) US$ 1 (3%) – – –
Software cost (programme) US$ 10 (52%) – – –
Indirect programme support (programme) US$ 9 (45%) – – –
Cost per new sanitation facility construction (incl. 
programme and household contributions)
US$ 68 – – –
Household financial contribution (hardware) US$ 48 – – –
Cost per person who gained access to  
a sanitation facility (programme only)
US$ 4.5 US$ 14.0 US$ 10.6 US$ 3.4***
Hardware cost (programme) US$ 0.1 (2%) – – US$ 0.3*** (9%)
Software cost US$ 2.5 (56%) US$ 10.4 (74%) US$ 5.5 (52%) US$ 2.6*** (78%)
Indirect programme support US$ 1.9 (42%) US$ 3.6 (26%) US$ 5.1 (48%) US$ 0.5*** (13%)
Total cost per person who gained access to a 
sanitation facility (incl. programme and 
household contributions)
US$ 15.4  US$ 14.7  No data US$ 6.4–US$ 18.4***
Household financial contribution per person (hardware) US$ 10.9 US$ 0.7  No data US$ 5–US$ 13
Table 6. Summary of VFM indicators for sanitation
15  In Bangladesh ODF certification was not part of the project. This number represents the people who moved to living in a 
community that was judged to be ODF at the endline evaluation.
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Cost-effectiveness
Cost per person who gained access  
to a sanitation facility and uses it
US$ 6.9
– –
US$ 4.1
Hardware cost (programme) US$ 0.2 (3%)
–
Software cost US$ 3.5 (51%)
Indirect programme support US$3.2 (46%) – – –
Total cost per person who gained access to a 
sanitation facility and uses it (incl. programme 
and household contributions)
US$ 23.6 – – –
Household financial contribution (hardware) US$ 16.7 – – –
(*) data is only available for 2014 (**) data is only available for 2013 and 2014; (***) cost per person who gained  
access to a sanitation facility and also received hygiene promotion messages
4.2.1 Economy
Data on the cost of key inputs for sanitation was only available for the programmes implemented  
by UNICEF, based on the contracts for implementing NGOs. These included data on the cost  
of CLTS training per facilitator, cost of a triggering event per village and the cost of a latrine  
(if paid for by the programme).
In the case of Zambia, the cost for CLTS training was estimated at US$ 45 for a facilitator. The cost 
of a village triggering event ranged from US$ 81 to US$ 174 per village, as against US$ 1,338 in 
Nigeria, a cost that included three months of follow-up activities after the triggering event. In 
Mozambique, triggering costed an estimated US$ 2,998 per community but it was not possible  
to fully explain this variation (whether due to larger community sizes for example), as the actual 
number of people reached was not recorded and so it was not possible to estimate the triggering  
cost per person. Comparable data from other national initiatives was only available for Nigeria, 
where WaterAid cited US$ 1,138 per village for the direct cost of triggering; a slightly lower figure 
to SHAWN. However, WaterAid did not include IPS costs and SHAWN did. A national review of 
CLTS activities in 30 states of Nigeria cited a similar average figure of US$ 1,400 for direct costs.16 
In the absence of comparators for the remaining countries, it was difficult to say whether economy 
was achieved. In Zambia, UNICEF confirmed that NGOs generally offered competitive market prices. 
Cost variability was generally explained by geographical factors (e.g. triggering a hard-to-reach 
district as opposed to one that is closer to the capital city) and by differences in population size,  
i.e. in the definition of what is referred to as a “village” or a “community”. A WASHCost study 
(2011) investigated cost drivers for community mobilisation through the “PEC Zonal” approach 
implemented in Mozambique.17 Factors such as size of the district, district population, coverage rate 
and population density did not seem to have any influence on the cost of the PEC Zonal contract. 
Therefore, the study concluded that other aspects, such as contract specifications (type and quantity 
of desired transport equipment and other tools required for animators to conduct CLTS campaigns) 
could be stronger cost drivers and would need to be investigated further. UNICEF Nigeria felt that 
switching from village-level to ward-level triggering had generated economies of scale (given that  
a ward is larger than a village and therefore, fewer triggering events were needed to  
reach the same number of villages) and brought costs down, although they had no data to support 
this finding.
16 DFID 2011. Assessment of community-led total sanitation (CLTS) in Nigeria (drafted by UNICEF and WaterAid. 
17  The “PEC-Zonal approach” consists of letting contracts to a local NGO for delivering community sensitisation services in a 
given district over the course of one year (renewable one year). These software support contracts implement jointly a variety of 
activities, including mobilising water point committees, conducting CLTS campaigns to promote sanitation and hygiene and 
strengthening spare parts providers.
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4.2.2 Efficiency and cost-efficiency 
Efficiency. For sanitation, efficiency can be assessed by examining how inputs (such as sanitation 
promotion activities) have resulted in outputs, such as the number of communities triggered 
through CLTS events and verified as having reached Open Defecation Free (ODF) status, the 
number of improved sanitation facilities built or the number of people who have gained access  
to improved sanitation.
In these studies efficiency measures were limited by the variable quality and availability of data  
on the number of communities triggered and verified as ODF, and on the number of latrines  
built. Challenges were met across all programmes, and particularly for government-implemented 
programmes: data was unavailable in Ethiopia and incomplete or unreliable in Mozambique. 
Extrapolations had to be made in Mozambique as detailed data was not available at the level of  
the districts where funding had been provided. This was also the case in Zambia, although the 
introduction of mobile-to-web (M2W) monitoring systems since 2014 is expected to improve  
data reliability and reduce data management costs. 
As in the case of water programmes, efficiency of sanitation activities can be estimated by comparing 
planned versus actual achievements. Achievement data was incomplete but varied between 55% and 
175% of what was planned depending on programmes and outputs. These indicators are imperfect 
as they assume that plans and budgets were set as realistic targets and that expenditure was in line 
with budgets, which is not always the case. For example, in Nigeria, significantly more ODF 
communities (certified and uncertified) were achieved than planned (165% achieved) but this was 
simply in line with the scope of SHAWN being increased from 12 to 20 LGAs in December 2011. 
ODF conversion rates (i.e. the percentage of triggered communities through CLTS that are verified 
as ODF) are a good efficiency indicator for sanitation programmes. Such an indicator varied 
between 10% and 39% among the programmes studied. The ODF conversion rate tends to drop 
when considering the number of verified villages versus self-reported ODF villages. In Zambia,  
the ODF conversion rate based on the number of verified villages stood at 22% at the end of 2014, 
but this goes up to over 30% when using data on reported ODF villages. This is in line with 
DFID’s expectations for a programme of this magnitude.18 In Nigeria, the ODF conversion rate  
was high, with an average of 39% of triggered communities reaching certified ODF status and 55% 
when based on the number of self-reported ODF communities. In both programmes, there were 
efficiency losses due to delays in completing the full ODF certification and third-party verification 
procedures. This means that actual ODF conversion rates were probably underestimated. 
ODF conversion rates also depend on the relative maturity of programmes, as they generally  
achieve a higher triggering/ODF rate the longer they have been implemented. In Mozambique,  
for instance, the ODF conversion rate based on certified communities was 10% in the second year  
of implementation, which is quite low compared to international standards, but increased to 16% 
in the third year. This increase could also be linked to an acceleration and improvement of ODF 
certification process. It also depends on starting conditions in the communities where triggering 
takes place. In Nigeria, where access to improved sanitation was initially between 11% and 41% 
(29% on average), the ODF conversion rate was higher than in Zambia and Mozambique,  
where access to sanitation was 8% and between 2% and 31% respectively before the start  
of the programmes.
The design of CLTS campaign can also influence ODF conversion rates. In Zambia, as shown  
in Box 5 below, CLTS efficiency is impacted by post-triggering follow-up as well as systematic 
monitoring through mobile-to-web systems, both of which reduced the risk of slippage and 
increased stakeholder motivation.
Finally, the efficiency of CLTS campaigns is also explained by the quality of the triggering.  
In Mozambique, poor quality of PEC Zonal contractors might have reduced efficiency.  
These are mainly small local NGOs or social enterprises that may not be adequately trained.
18 2014 DFID Annual Review.
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Box 5. Monitoring ODF conversion in the ZSHP in Zambia
In the ZSHP, the ODF conversion rate (i.e. 
proportion of villages triggered through the 
CATS component that have been verified as 
ODF) has increased between mid-2013 and the 
end of 2014, and is currently at around 22%. 
These improvements are related to a number of 
factors, including involving NGOs as facilitators 
at district level through the 2013 Scale-Up 
Strategy, increased monitoring efforts (e.g. 
provision of regular technical support and 
mobile-to-web systems), and post-triggering 
strengthening (e.g. having stakeholder meetings 
over the subsequent five months until full ODF 
is achieved, providing incentives to champions 
after successful ODF verification, and 
recognising and rewarding achievement).
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Cost-efficiency. The cost per community verified as ODF varied between US$ 1,584 in Zambia 
and US$ 11,941 in Mozambique. Cost per person living in an ODF community ranged between 
US$ 17 in Nigeria and US$ 37 in Bangladesh, whereas the cost per person who had gained access  
to a sanitation facility ranged between US$ 3.4 in Zambia and US$ 14 in Mozambique. These  
costs are mostly made up of community mobilisation and indirect programme support. Yet, it is 
important to note that it was not possible to include all IPS costs for all programmes (including the 
portion borne by the government for all programmes). Direct hardware expenditure on sanitation 
only took place in Bangladesh where some ultra-poor households and hard-to-reach areas received 
subsidies for latrines – but this represented only 1% of the total expenditure on sanitation.
These ranges demonstrate that different levels of effort and expenditure are required depending on 
starting sanitation conditions and local context. In Bangladesh, there has been a decade-long push 
to reduce open defecation with the result that most communities have already been triggered at  
least once. The focus of SHEWA-B’s interventions was therefore to support households to convert 
temporary or shared latrines into more permanent and private facilities. For that reason, the number 
of households who moved to a situation where they were living in an ODF environment as a result 
of the programme was relatively small (and the costs per person were therefore higher than in  
other countries). On the other hand, the cost per person gaining access to a latrine was low when 
compared to other programmes, as only a small amount of focused social intermediation was 
required to encourage household investment in new toilets. 
For the Mozambique and Zambia programmes, comparisons of cost-efficiency indicators  
across different years showed a significant decrease in the costs per CLTS campaign over time.  
In Mozambique, cost efficiency was also better than the national average and when compared  
to the UNICEF One Million Initiative Programme (See Box 6 on page 26).
Source: Authors based on UNICEF Progress Reports and DFID 
Annual Reviews.”
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Box 6. Cost efficiency of CLTS campaigns in Mozambique
Box 7. Cost efficiency of CLTS campaigns in Zambia
In Mozambique, the cost per district that PRONASAR CF incurred when conducting a CLTS 
campaign roughly halved every year since 2012. The average cost of CLTS per district triggered  
was actually 18% less than what had been planned initially. This is likely to be explained by: 
• The nature of sanitation promotion activities and the time at which they happen in the programme 
cycle (initial set-up costs for a programme lead to higher spending in initial years);
• An improvement in procurement performance and contract negotiation over time.
The cost of a PEC Zonal contract per district paid by PRONASAR CF was 40% lower than the 
national average estimated by WASHCost (WASHCost, 2011) (adjusted for 2013 prices). In addition, 
PRONASAR CF costs per triggered community and per community that achieved ODF status were 
40% and 23% lower respectively than the costs incurred by the UNICEF One Million Initiative 
(adjusted to the same year). This might be partly explained by the fact that there were more IPS costs 
in the One Million Initiative (33% compared to 26% for PRONASAR). These comparisons need 
to be handled with caution, as the reliability of ODF figures might vary between programmes.
For the ZSHP in Zambia, the cost per person who gained access to a sanitation facility decreased by 
58% between 2013 Q3 and 2014 Q4. This was explained by several programmatic changes, mainly 
the implementation of the Programme Improvement Plan and the Scale-Up Strategy in mid-2013, 
through which NGOs became partners and programme facilitators at the district level. Increased 
focus on monitoring via mobile-to-web systems and post-triggering activities also had a significant 
effect on cost-efficiency. Indeed, villages where mobile-to-web systems are used report a cost per 
person with access to improved sanitation and hygiene of US$ 2.40–2.60, approximately 24% 
lower than the average for the whole programme. 
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Other factors related to implementation can influence cost efficiency of CLTS campaigns. In 
Nigeria, cost-efficiency was improved by a shift to ‘ward-level triggering’, where ward-level sensitisation 
meetings with local leaders ensured ward-level support and buy-in prior to village-level triggering 
events (wards are larger than villages in Nigeria). It was thought to be more efficient to hold these 
meetings jointly for all relevant representatives within a single ward in advance of the triggering 
events rather than to approach them separately on the day of village-level triggering.  
Finally, it is important to take into account a programme’s capacity to leverage household 
investments to build latrines, given that with a CLTS approach, households are expected to use their 
resources in cash and in-kind to build latrines. The SHEWA-B programme in Bangladesh was the 
most efficient at leveraging household investments. Programme expenditure of US$ 20 leveraged an 
additional US$ 48.50 of household investment for each latrine built. Comparator data from BRAC 
shows that total hardware cost per latrine was between US$ 41 and US$ 104, and it can be seen 
that leveraged investment for toilets built as a result of the SHEWA-B programme is at the lower 
end of this range. This demonstrates that households were choosing lower-cost options. In 
Mozambique, the average household contribution to build a traditional improved or improved 
latrine was estimated based on Objective 2 survey at US$ 3.6 in cash and US$ 14 in kind (labour 
and materials), against a US$ 14 contribution from the programme.
4.2.3 Effectiveness and cost-effectiveness
Effectiveness and cost-effectiveness assesses how well sanitation promotion and CLTS triggering 
activities have led to people having improved access to sanitation facilities and actually using these 
facilities over time. Data on effectiveness (and thus, on cost effectiveness) was only available in 
Bangladesh and Zambia. 
In Zambia, the proportion of the population in target districts using improved sanitation and 
handwashing facilities significantly increased from a baseline of 8.3% in June 2013 to 25% in 
December 2013, and to 42% by December 2014. Based on cumulative programme costs up to 
December 2013, the total programme cost per user was estimated at US$ 4.10. This figure is higher 
than the US$ 2.96 that had been anticipated in the Business Case, but is expected to significantly 
decrease by the end of the programme in 2016. The cost per person using improved sanitation and 
hand-washing facilities is 20% higher than the cost per person who has gained access to a sanitation 
facility, which may be explained by the fact that some households stop using the facilities later down 
the line. Since 2013, increased attention on interpersonal communications and strengthening of 
follow up activities have played a key role in sustaining ODF status over time and minimising the 
risk of villages slipping back into open defecation. The involvement of local government staff was 
also key to sustaining sanitation promotion efforts. 
In Bangladesh, programme monitoring suggests that 67% of latrines remained functional at the end 
of the programme (where a functional latrine was defined as being well-kept and in use). The cost 
per person using an improved sanitation facility is 53% higher than the cost per person gaining 
access to any kind of sanitation facility. Ongoing support for faecal sludge management is likely  
to lead to longer term usage of latrines and reduce rates of abandonment.
4.3 Hygiene promotion
Three of the six programmes reviewed included a hygiene promotion component that was 
monitored independently from activities dealing with access to sanitation, including Bangladesh, 
Zambia and Pakistan. The programme in Pakistan provided hygiene kits to beneficiaries in a context 
of humanitarian relief. The programmes in Bangladesh and Zambia conducted a mass media campaign 
to promote sanitation and hygiene. They also conducted social mobilisation in communities, 
whether as part of sanitation promotion activities (CLTS in Zambia) or independently as in 
Bangladesh. When hygiene and sanitation promotion activities were conducted and monitored 
together (as for social mobilisation in Zambia), the VFM of these activities was analysed in the 
“access to sanitation” section above – it was not possible to separate out the hygiene elements  
for a disaggregated analysis.
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Table 7 below presents in more details the main characteristics of the hygiene promotion activities 
for each of these programmes.
Table 7. Hygiene promotion activities – programme characteristics
Bangladesh Pakistan Zambia
SHEWA-B Response to 2010 Floods ZSHP
Activities • Hygiene promotion of safe 
sanitation and water messages 
through social intermediation
• National mass media campaign
• Delivery of hygiene kits • Interpersonal communication 
and mass media campaigns
• Hygiene promotion as part  
of CLTS campaigns
Context  
(at baseline)
• High rates of access to water  
and sanitation
• 47% of the population in project 
areas were able to state at least 
one key message from each  
of the water, sanitation and 
handwashing messages (2008)
• Emergency and early recovery 
context
• Low access to handwashing 
facilities near toilets  
(9% in 2013)
Type of hygiene 
facilities 
constructed
• Various N/A • Mainly tippy-taps in 
communities.
Implementers • Households for hardware
• Local NGOs with support from 
national NGOs
• NGOs (Care, Islamic Relief, 
Mercy Corps)
• UNICEF, partner NGOs, 
District Councils
Sources of 
funding *
• Programme and government 
counterpart funding (software 
and IPS), households for 
hardware
• Programme • UNICEF programme funds, 
NGOs, GRZ, and households 
(for the construction of 
handwashing facilities)
(*) expenditure included in VFM indicators is highlighted in bold
Table 8 opposite presents a number of VFM indicators calculated for hygiene promotion activities. 
These indicators could only be estimated for Bangladesh, with some limited results for Pakistan.
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Bangladesh 
2008-2014 
SHEWA-B
Pakistan 
Response to  
2010 floods
Zambia 
2012-2014 
ZSHP
Cost-efficiency
Programme cost per person reached with hygiene promotion activities US$ 0.68 – US$ 0.14
Cost per person able to recall at least one sanitation and hygiene 
message
US$ 1.3 – –
Programme cost per new person gaining access to a handwashing 
station at a convenient location for handwashing after defecation
US$ 13 – –
Hardware cost 
N/A
– –
Software cost – –
Indirect programme support – –
Programme cost per hygiene kit delivered – US$ 16–36 –
Cost per person receiving a hygiene kit – US$ 3.3–3.5 –
Cost-effectiveness
Cost per person observed handwashing with soap and water – –
Before food preparation US$ 61 – –
Before eating US$ 36 – –
After defecation US$ 6 – –
Cost per female caregiver observed handwashing with soap and water – –
Before food preparation US$ 12 – –
Before eating US$ 25 – –
After defecation US$ 5 – –
Table 8. Summary of VFM indicators for hygiene promotion
4.3.1 Economy
There was no data available for these programmes on the cost of key inputs for hygiene promotion 
(such as the costs of printing/distributing Behavioural Change Communication training materials, 
the cost per day of one village hygiene promoter, the cost of soap or of a hygiene kit distributed for 
humanitarian programmes). 
4.3.2 Efficiency and cost-efficiency 
Efficiency. Efficiency assesses how well the inputs, such as hygiene promotion activities at 
community-level and mass media campaigns, have resulted in people gaining access to handwashing 
facilities and washing hands at critical times.
In Zambia, based on DFID’s recommendations to give more focus to this component in early  
2014 (due to low rates of handwashing and sustained behaviour change), the national mass media 
campaign was revamped and intensified (in addition to social mobilisation activities already in  
place through CLTS). As a result, the number of people reached with hygiene promotion activities 
increased by 90%, from 3.3 million at the end of 2013 to 6.29 million by the end of 2014, 
exceeding the initial target of 4.65 million.
Hygiene interventions tend to have a range of targets at output and an assumed outcome level 
which makes direct comparisons or benchmarking challenging. In Bangladesh, for example, there 
are data on the presence of key infrastructure which could be used as a proxy for the output of the 
hygiene intervention, but they can be expressed using several different measures. The iccdr,b endline 
report provides detailed information on outputs in SHEWA-B intervention areas relating to the 
presence of key hygiene facilities. These compared the presence of key facilities at critical locations 
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as proxy indicators for hygiene behaviour between the baseline and the endline of the programme  
as follows: 
• 3% increase, representing an additional 0.48 million people with facilities, soap/ash and water  
to wash their hands after defecation (not statistically significant); 
• 7% increase, representing an additional 1.4 million people with water only to wash their hands  
after defecation (statistically significant);
• 5% increase, representing an additional 1.02 million people) with a WASH station in a convenient 
place after defecation (statistically significant).
Other outcomes in the endline report included the hygienic disposal of faeces by parents of 473,730 
children under-5 and household drinking water for 3.12 million people stored in a covered 
container.
As for sanitation promotion, the quality of hygiene behaviour-change promotion depends on the 
availability and capacity of NGOs at district and local level. This depends on the ability of NGOs 
and support organisations to attract and retain high quality staff at the local level (through salaries 
partly) which in turn is driven by other development programmes ongoing in the programme area.
In Zambia and Bangladesh, the efficiency of hygiene promotion also depended on the balance 
between community-based social mobilisation and mass-media interventions and their relative 
efficiency at promoting hardware investments to support behaviour change. As the two 
interventions are designed to complement each other, it is not possible to disaggregate their effects 
and only the combined effect can be reported.  Further complicating the situation, in Bangladesh, 
the endline study also looked at changes in adjacent areas which lay outside the programme area and 
in most cases found no significant difference between changes within and outside the project area. 
Interpreting this finding is difficult. It is probably due to the general trend of improving hygiene 
awareness across the country and the presence of significant large scale interventions in other 
districts not reached by SHEWA-B, delivered either by the Government of Bangladesh directly or 
through large scale NGO programmes such as BRAC. This means that it is challenging to estimate 
the marginal impact of the SHEWA-B programme and to compare it with programmes in other 
countries. It is clear that positive outcomes have been achieved in SHEWA-B areas, but those 
positive outcomes cannot with certainty be directly attributed to the programme.  
Cost-efficiency. As mentioned above, cost-efficiency can be measured through several indicators 
according to the number of beneficiaries reached by the message or getting access to handwashing 
facilities. The cost per people receiving both social mobilisation and mass media messages 
promoting hygiene was US$ 0.68 in Bangladesh and US$ 0.14 in Zambia. 
In Zambia, the intensification of the national mass media campaigns focusing on hand-washing at 
critical times, in addition to social mobilisation through CLTS, has enabled the programme to reach 
beneficiaries at an extra cost of  US$ 0.09 per person since the beginning of 2014. This increase  
is mainly related to direct software costs, related to the new contract agreements with ZAMCOM 
and Barefeet, the communication companies hired for the mass media campaigns. Thus, the current 
programme cost per person reached with hygiene promotion activities stands at US$ 0.14,  
which is below DFID estimations of US$ 0.19.
The cost per person gaining access to a handwashing station including water and soap in an 
appropriate dispenser at a convenient location for handwashing after defecation was US$ 12 in 
Bangladesh. The cost per person of providing water (only) at a convenient location for handwashing 
after defecation was US$ 8. It was not possible to calculate the cost per person gaining access to a 
handwashing station only for Zambia, as those costs are combined with those of the CLTS 
triggering events.
In Pakistan the cost per person provided with a hygiene kit by different NGOs varied between US$ 
2.44 and US$ 3.49, mostly due to the fact that hygiene kits simply contained different items.
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4.3.3 Effectiveness and cost-effectiveness
Effectiveness of hygiene promotion assess how well hygiene promotion activities are converted  
into people having a sustained access to handwashing facilities and actually using the facilities  
after defecation. Data on effectiveness and thus cost effectiveness was only available for SHEWA-B 
in Bangladesh.
Observational techniques were used in SHEWA-B to estimate the numbers of people practising  
key behaviours at critical times (before food preparation, before eating, before feeding a child, after 
child defecation and after defecation). While significant improvements in these key indicators  
were observed over time within the SHEWA-B intervention area, there was no significant difference 
between the observed changes in the intervention areas when compared to the control areas.  
This also applied to the recall of mass media promotion messages in 2009 and 2012.
As stated above, it is challenging to estimate the marginal impact of the SHEWA-B programme and 
to compare it with programmes in other countries as the positive outcomes cannot be attributed to 
the programme with certainty. It is also important to note, however, that very few programmes 
include baseline and endline assessments of behaviour carried out with the same rigour as those 
which were carried out for the SHEWA-B programme. Similar problems of attribution are likely  
to apply to all the other programmes and projects which were studied but only in SHEWA-B,  
with its more rigorous evaluation studies, can this problem of attribution be identified. 
The cost-effectiveness indicators (as shown in Table 8) show a range of values for changing hygiene 
behaviours, depending on the type of targeted hygiene behaviour (for example, handwashing with 
soap before food preparation, before eating or after defecation) and on the target audience for these 
messages. It was more cost-effective to target female caregivers, suggesting that they tended to 
respond better to hygiene messages. 
4.4 WASH in Schools
Two of the six programmes reviewed included a specific component for increasing access to water 
and sanitation in schools, i.e. Zambia and Bangladesh. 
In Zambia, the institutional sanitation component provided appropriate, gender-sensitive and 
child-friendly sanitation and handwashing facilities in primary schools, as well as demand-creation 
activities. In some schools, all facilities were paid for by ZSHP under the “Interim package”,  
while for others, a “Low-cost package” was used, which is integrated to the sanitation marketing 
component and is thus able to offer similar standards with a lower cost design.
In Bangladesh, schools received either new or rehabilitated water points, toilet facilities or both 
from the programme.
Table 9. WASH in schools activities – key programme characteristics
Bangladesh Zambia
Activities • School Sanitation and Hygiene Education 
packages delivered in schools
• Construction or rehabilitation of latrines
• Construction or rehabilitation of water points
• Construction of S&H facilities in schools
• SLTS in schools
• Development of national S&H policies & 
support to NRWSSP
Context Primary and secondary schools Primary schools
Type of sanitation 
facilities constructed
Shared latrines – separate for boys and girls. Onsite 
facilities.
Gender-segregated toilet facilities (50 children per 
latrine) with a nearby hand-washing facility, and a 
latrine equipped with bars for disabled children.
Implementers DPHE and partner NGOs. Private contractors for 
construction.
UNICEF, partner NGOs, District Councils
Sources of funding * Programme funds Programme funds, UNICEF (administration 
fee), NGOs, GRZ, and communities (for the 
Low-Cost Package)
(*) expenditure included in VFM indicators is highlighted in bold.
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Table 10. Summary of VFM indicators for WASH in schools
Bangladesh 
2008-2014 
SHEWA-B
Zambia 
2012-2014 
ZSHP
Cost-efficiency
Programme cost per pupil gaining access to sanitation and hygiene  
in school
– US$ 38.4
Hardware cost – US$ 29.7 (77%)
Software cost – US$ 4.2 (11%)
Indirect programme support – US$ 5.5 (12%)
Cost per school-aged child gaining access to a clean functional  
latrine at school
US$ 10.9 –
Hardware cost US$ 4.2 (37%) –
Software cost US$ 5.3 (50%) –
Indirect programme support US$ 1.4 (13%) –
Cost per school-aged child gaining access to a safe water point  
at school
US$ 38.7 –
Hardware cost US$ 14.9 (39%) –
Software cost US$ 18.7 (48%) –
Indirect programme support US$ 5.1 (13%) –
Cost per school-aged child receiving School Sanitation  
and Hygiene Education messages
US$ 7.7 –
Hardware cost US$ 2.9 (38%) –
Software cost US$ 3.8 (49%) –
Indirect programme support US$ 1.0 (13%) –
Cost-effectiveness
Cost per school-aged child retaining SSHE messages US$ 7.7 –
Hardware cost US$ 2.9 (38%) –
Software cost US$ 3.8 (49%) –
Indirect programme support US$ 1.0 (13%) –
Cost per school-aged child observed to be using soap after defecation US$ 37 –
4.4.1 Economy
In Bangladesh, the programme spent an average of US$ 714 per school on School Sanitation and 
Hygiene Education packages, which included the provision of teaching resources and the delivery of 
hygiene promotion activities in schools. Hardware was provided under separate contracts, for which 
detailed cost breakdowns were not available at the time of this analysis.
In Zambia, NGOs generally offered competitive prices, with cost variability explained by differences 
in geography (e.g. hard-to-reach districts or with poor soil conditions were more costly to serve). While 
costs varied between NGOs, direct comparisons were difficult as each NGO provided a slightly different 
set of activities. Nonetheless, some factors could be identified which affected variations in costs:  
• Quality of the output – The unit cost of a school sanitation facility is US$ 925 for the Interim 
Package and US$ 424 for the Low-Cost Package,19 which represents a significant reduction in 
monetary costs as compared to the original design (US$ 2,000 per latrine seat). 
19  Under the Interim Package, all facilities were paid for by ZSHP. The Low-Cost Package is integrated to the a sanitation 
marketing programme involving local masons, maintaining the same standards of the Interim Package but offering  
cheaper designs.
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• Intensity of activities – the cost of training a community champion for CLTS is US$ 45, while 
training for school facilitators ranges between US$ 56 and US$ 179.  This difference may be due to 
the fact that some school training activities were more extensive, covering more people per school. 
Similarly, the difference between the cost of a village triggering (US$ 81–174) and a school 
triggering (US$ 41–248) may also be due to a variation in the activities entailed. 
4.4.2 Efficiency and cost-efficiency 
Efficiency. The realisation rate of school water, sanitation and hygiene facilities, against planned 
targets, varied over time. The ZSHP School sanitation and hygiene component faced significant 
delays during the first 1.5 years of implementation, due to disagreements over technical design 
specifications between the Ministry of Education, Science, Vocational Training and Early Education 
and UNICEF. While only 15 schools had been reached in 2013 Q4, UNICEF and partners made 
considerable efforts to catch-up and had provided 153 schools with access to adequate sanitation 
and hygiene by February 2015.
Cost-efficiency. The cost of the “WASH in Schools” component of SHEWA-B varied from  
US$ 3 to US$ 39 per student, depending on whether schools received school sanitation and hygiene 
education packages alone or also benefited from hardware improvements (see Figure 8). For the 
ZSHP in Zambia, the programme cost per pupil gaining access to sanitation and hygiene in schools 
was US$ 38.4 over the lifetime of the programme. This indicator has been improving since mid-
2014 due to a reduction in support costs, which became less significant once the start-up costs had 
been incurred. However, these figures for ZSHP need to be interpreted with caution. On one hand, 
while resources for some schools had already been committed, S&H facilities had not been fully 
constructed in all of them, which results in a lower number of schools and children accessing the 
facilities. On the other hand, although expenditure committed for both the Interim and the Low-
Cost Packages has been included (as it is not possible to clearly disaggregate expenditure between 
them), only achievements through the Interim Package have been considered, with the exclusion  
of results through the Low-Cost Package (as its implementation fully began in 2015). Both of  
these issues lead to an over-estimation of the costs per school and child reached, and thus to  
an under-estimation of the cost-efficiency associated with this programme component.
Figure 8. Cost-efficiency indicator for WASH in Schools: US$ per school-age child
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4.4.3 Effectiveness and cost-effectiveness
Cost effectiveness data was only available for Bangladesh. In SHEWA-B, cost-effectiveness was 
estimated at US$ 8 per child retaining SSHE messages, whereas the cost of ensuring the adoption  
of hygienic practices was estimated at US$ 37 per child (based on observing them using soap after 
defecation). This shows that achieving adoption of handwashing with soap is considerably more 
costly than achieving a change in knowledge, but it is most likely an investment worth making 
given the significant health impacts associated with handwashing with soap. 
Cost effectiveness of WASH in schools is driven in part by the same drivers as for WASH for 
domestic use, that is, technical considerations such as depth (for groundwater supply) or the  
quality of water provided. At the same time, once actual behaviours are taken into consideration, 
the quality of the School Sanitation and Hygiene Education, or School-led Total Sanitation 
interventions will also have a strong impact on outcomes, particularly in terms of management of 
latrines (so that they remain clean, functional and accessible) and key hygiene behaviours. Drop-
back rates in schools (i.e. where toilet or water points are provided but where usage is subsequently 
limited) may be driven in part by dimensions of the schools themselves: their size, the relative 
standing and security of teaching staff, and diversity within the school community. Strong female 
head teachers often play an important role as well, for example in maintaining a focus on 
accessibility to latrines and handwashing facilities for girls, particularly as they pass menarche.
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5 How can VFM analysis be used  
to improve WASH programmes? 
This section reflects on the VFM-WASH project’s findings to extract key learning points on the use 
of VFM analysis to improve WASH programmes and their management. Given the limited size and 
geographical spread of the research sample (multiple programmes in six different country contexts), 
combined with the methodological challenges encountered for conducting the analysis (as presented 
in Section 6 below), it appears premature to draw broad conclusions from the VFM indicators that 
have been computed through the project.
The main emphasis therefore has been placed on identifying how VFM analysis can be used at the 
level of specific programmes. The usefulness of this type of analysis will increase once a larger number 
of programmes and funders starts to use it, preferably based on a common methodology, and therefore 
when a more substantial set of comparable data becomes available. For this reason, Section 6 formulates 
recommendations on how methodological challenges for conducting the VFM analysis of WASH 
programmes can be overcome and a “VFM culture” be created in the sector.
After identifying the various stages of the programme cycle at which VFM analysis can be used, this 
section explains why making sense of the results from VFM analysis for programme management 
requires a thorough understanding of relevant external and internal factors: 
• External factors are defined as factors that are outside of programme managers’ control, such as 
hydrogeological conditions, overall macro-economic conditions or external shocks during programme 
implementation (including natural events such as droughts or flooding). These factors are important 
as they influence the costs, efficiency and effectiveness of interventions; 
• Internal factors are defined as areas over which managers can exert control and which need to  
be examined at all stages, so as to identify opportunities to improve the VFM of the programme.
5.1 Using VFM analysis throughout  
the programme cycle 
VFM analysis is ultimately an analytical tool that can be used to reveal information about the way 
in which WASH programmes are delivering results. Programme managers can use VFM indicators 
to formulate informed choices to maximise the results generated from public funds invested in the 
WASH sector. This tool can be useful at various stages of programme design and implementation, 
including programme design, implementation and evaluation stages as shown in Figure 9 below.
Figure 9 – Where VFM analysis fits in the WASH programming cycle
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At programme design stage, VFM analysis can be used: 
• To inform decisions about the most effective and cost-effective approaches to achieve goals set for 
the intervention, including:
 – Implementation arrangements: should funds be allocated to the government through a national 
programme, to an international organisation that can then selects local implementers, or directly 
to implementing agents on the ground? For example, DFID in Mozambique was interested in a 
VFM analysis to help identify whether to continue contributing to a large government 
programme or to channel funding via UNICEF; 
 – Optimal combination of programme interventions: for example, some programme may choose to 
only focus on hygiene and sanitation if these are deemed the most cost-effective interventions in 
the local context (as UNICEF chose to do in Zambia). 
• To obtain benchmark reference points on costs of inputs and outputs for budgeting and planning; 
• To help funders build the business case in order to justify spending allocations. However, it is very 
difficult to attribute impacts to specific WASH interventions, which means that cost-benefit analysis 
can only be based on findings from a limited set of research rather than from real-life programmes. 
At programme implementation stage, VFM analysis can be a critical tool for the following: 
• Better monitoring of programme implementation, making sense of data collected in real time 
(crucially, tracking how variations in inputs might give rise to variations in results) and identifying 
specific bottlenecks or capacity gaps which could be addressed to improve VFM in later stages of 
programme implementation. This obviously depends on information being available (see Section 6) 
but it can be done on an ongoing basis or through annual reviews, given that collecting and 
analysing the necessary information can be costly if no adequate tools are in place; 
• Programme evaluation at mid-term or end of project. VFM analysis can identify strengths and 
weaknesses of various programme implementation models and provide a stronger analytical basis for 
recommending adjustments. Findings can also help with extracting lessons for the design of future 
programmes.
When using VFM reference data, it is essential to record at which point in the programme life-cycle 
VFM analysis was performed, as it is quite normal for programmes to incur higher costs and show 
lower efficiency during the start-up phase, as implementation arrangements can generate additional 
costs. As described below, it is also essential to take into account external and internal factors that 
affect VFM.
5.2 Taking account of external factors 
impacting VFM 
External factors predominantly relate to the physical, social and economic characteristics of the 
intervention area and need to be understood from the moment of project conception and design. 
For example, hydrogeological conditions will determine the best way to develop water resources and 
provide water supplies and will therefore have a major impact on the economy and efficiency of 
water provision. Where groundwater tables are deep, rainwater is unreliable or water quality is very 
poor, simple low-cost technologies may not be appropriate. The location, spatial distribution and 
social heterogeneity of communities will influence the efficiency and effectiveness of different social 
mobilisation techniques and may influence decisions about how to deliver sanitation or hygiene 
promotion. Some “external shocks” (such as flooding events or macro-economic events) are more 
difficult to anticipate at programme design. However, programme designers should carry out a “risk 
analysis” in order to assess the likelihood of such events and their likely impact on VFM, adjusted 
by the probability of such events occurring.  
Programme managers must understand external factors in order to place estimates of VFM 
indicators from elsewhere into context. For example, the cost of developing water supply services 
varies according to hydrogeology and this has a knock-on effect on economy, cost-efficiency and 
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VFM dimensions External factors impacting VFM Examples
Economy Hydrogeological conditions: availability of water 
sources, depth to groundwater and quality of water 
influence choice about water production and 
distribution technologies and drive capital costs 
(particularly the cost of drilling for groundwater)  
and operational issues.
• Bangladesh: The risk of arsenic contamination in shallow 
aquifers means that more expensive deep tubewells or 
surface water systems are needed in some locations. 
• Pakistan: Water ponds constructed by Islamic Relief in 
areas with unconsolidated soils required more expensive 
groundworks. Unexpected variations in the groundwater 
table drove up tubewell/bore well drilling costs in the 
Mercy Corps programme.
• In Mozambique, Technical difficulties encountered due  
to complex hydrogeological conditions led to a change  
in drilling technology.
Location (e.g. distance to capital city) and pre-
existing levels of development (access to basic services, 
infrastructure)
Mozambique: PRONASAR CF intervenes in very diverse 
geographical areas: Maputo province is very close to the capital 
city, but other targeted districts are much further way, increasing 
the costs of equipment and staff mobility. VFM indicators 
should preferably be tracked by region (or district) and the 
impact of such variations be explicitly taken into account.
Pre-existing levels of social awareness and 
understanding of hygiene  
Bangladesh: The high rate of exposure to CLTS results in 
high awareness of the risks associated with open defecation 
and a high rate of toilet use, meaning that CLTS-style 
triggering would have limited further impact. Designers of 
SHEWA-B chose instead to focus sanitation interventions  
on facilitating provision of permanent private toilets.
Level of development of local markets for 
contractors and supply of equipment and spare parts
Bangladesh: A vibrant local market for manufacturing 
equipment for water and sanitation drives down costs.  
Where markets are less developed, additional emphasis 
would need to be placed on sanitation marketing.
Economics (inflation, cost of living, cost of doing 
business etc.)
Ethiopia: Inflation caused large increases in costs of labour 
and materials during the programme, which meant that 
additional funding had to be requested later in the programme 
life. Such inflation could potentially have been anticipated  
to secure adequate funding from the start.
Overall context: humanitarian crisis, 
political stability, natural disasters
Pakistan: Procurement by the NGO Care was affected by 
‘scarcity pricing’ as suppliers sought to take advantage of the 
humanitarian crisis to apply higher prices.
Efficiency and  
Cost Efficiency
Overall context: humanitarian crisis, 
political stability, natural disasters
Mozambique: External factors in 2013 such as flooding in 
Zambezi and political turmoil can explain the decrease in  
the realisation rate of water points during that year. However, 
the realisation rate went back up after the flooding – which 
means that it is essential to assess the impact of these external 
factors separately from those linked to programme design.
Effectiveness  
and Cost-
Effectiveness
• Capacity of local staff in programme areas, including 
the potential for local government to actively manage 
WASH programmes and budgets within the constraints 
of local government systems and processes
In Bangladesh, at mid-term review, poor retention and low 
capacity of local Community Health Promoters was identified 
as a factor limiting the sustainability of outcomes in target 
communities.
cost-effectiveness. Comparing these indicators across locations with very different conditions 
therefore makes little sense. However, the efficiency and effectiveness of the water supply 
intervention should be independent of hydrogeology and be more strongly influenced by 
programmatic decisions about procurement for example; so those indicators can be compared across 
areas with different conditions. 
Table 11 shows a selection of external factors that are impacting the VFM of the WASH 
programmes under review.
Table 11 Examples of external factors impacting the VFM of WASH programmes
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5.3 Taking account of internal factors 
impacting VFM 
Programme managers need to focus on extracting learning from the internal factors that affect VFM 
analysis so as to inform programme design and implementation decisions. The table below shows 
examples of internal factors that are impacting the VFM of WASH programmes under review and 
that would likely need to be considered in other cases.
Table 12. Examples of internal factors impacting the VFM of WASH programmes
VFM dimensions Internal factors impacting VFM Examples
Economy Programme management: Procurement efficiency 
and financial management efficiency will impact the 
costs of inputs
Mozambique: Weak procurement capacity and 
financial management in PRONASAR CF initially 
increased programme costs, negatively impacting 
economy. Improvements during the course of the 
programme means that the cost per water point and 
cost per CLTS campaigns now compare favourably 
with other WASH programmes in the country.
Efficiency and  
Cost Efficiency
Choice of project components (i.e. water, 
sanitation and hygiene) and their combination 
Bangladesh: Combining investments in water, 
sanitation and hygiene promotion is likely to have 
improved  cost-efficiency (and cost-effectiveness)  
as some costs were combined and multiple hygiene-
related messages are likely to improve the impact  
on behavioural change.
Mozambique: PEC Zonal promotion and education 
contracts perform social mobilisation activities both 
for construction of public water points and to conduct 
CLTS activities to encourage communities to adopt 
sanitation.
Choice of programme implementation 
arrangements: which can be through governments, 
international organisations, supported by NGOs, 
community level facilitators etc.
Zambia: The involvement of local NGOs as CLTS 
facilitators at community level since March 2013  
has increased cost efficiency.
Bangladesh: In 2010, in response to reported patchy 
performance of Community Health Promoters, 
UNICEF appointed two apex NGOs (WaterAid  
and PLAN) to support the local NGO providers,  
train CHPs and promote standardised reporting.  
This increased IPS but had a positive impact on  
the performance of programme implementation.
Nigeria: More communities achieved ODF status due 
to a shift from ward-level to village-level triggering.
Funding arrangements, including the degree to 
which contributions from national and local 
governments as well as from households are leveraged. 
The quality of promotional work impacts on the 
extent to which households invest.
Bangladesh: The programme focused on demand-
creation conducted by the Community Health 
Promoters and required households to cover most or 
all of the investment costs. This resulted in accelerated 
water point and latrine construction in  households 
where there is high demand. Household investments 
in private water points and through their contributions 
to public water points from water user groups are 
estimated to total more than US$ 14.5 million.
Contracting arrangements: Structure of contracts 
and incentives of local governments and contractors to 
perform
Mozambique: The absence of performance indicators 
and low accountability of province and district level 
staff and contractors reduced the efficiency of the 
programme. 
Quality of programme implementation: especially 
for behaviour-change interventions, this largely 
depends on the availability and capacity of NGOs at 
district and/or local level
Mozambique: Poor quality of PEC Zonal contractors 
might have reduced efficiency. These are mainly small 
local NGOs or social enterprises, which are sometimes 
inadequately trained. The capacity and retention of staff 
of local NGOs tends to vary, especially if salaries are low.
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VFM dimensions Internal factors impacting VFM Examples
Effectiveness and 
Cost-Effectiveness
Targeting of interventions: the extent to which  
the programme effectively targets those who do  
not have access to services
Bangladesh has a pre-existing high access rate  
to water services. Therefore cost effectiveness was 
dependent on good targeting, to ensure that new  
users gain access to high–quality arsenic-free water, 
which was the focus of the intervention. 
Percentage of funding allocated to software, 
particularly to activities to change behaviour  
and encourage long-term use of services
Nigeria: The programme currently spends only an 
estimated 1% of its expenditure on WP expenditure 
on software (although this might be a slight under-
estimate). This is low and is likely to affect the long 
term sustainability of WP functionality. 
Percentage of funding allocated to IPS: Improved 
real-time monitoring of the sustainability of outcomes 
can improve responsiveness, making it possible to 
make positive changes to the programme operation.
Bangladesh: The mid-term review identified 
weaknesses that resulted in changes in the content  
of hygiene promotion and social mobilisation and 
additional support arrangements to improve delivery.  
This was possible in part because of the high quality 
of monitoring data available from the various 
monitoring contracts funded by the project.
Decisions made during programme design have a high potential impact on VFM. Choices about 
what interventions to include in a project in order to achieve the ultimate impact goal (e.g. on 
health or poverty reduction), how these interventions are combined, what approaches will be  
used, how beneficiaries will be targeted and implementation arrangements all have an influence  
on programme efficiency and effectiveness. There are three main areas where programme designers 
need to formulate choices during programme design that ultimately impact on VFM:
• Selecting programme components and activities: Most WASH programmes are intended to 
achieve health impacts; impact is often expressed in terms of reduction in diarrhoeal disease. To 
achieve a reduction in diarrhoea, it is generally necessary to provide sustained access to adequate 
quantities of water, effect a change in sanitation behaviours so as to reduce human exposure to 
excreta and to ensure handwashing with soap at critical times. However, programmes which contain 
water, sanitation and hygiene components are complex and coordinating the interventions is 
challenging. At the same time, there is some evidence to suggest that targeting behaviour change on 
a very small number of key behaviours may be more effective than attempting to address a larger 
number. Thus, although they both have health improvements at the impact level of their results 
framework, SHEWA-B in Bangladesh aimed to influence outcomes for water supply, sanitation and 
hygiene as well as WASH in schools, while in Zambia the programme was more tightly focused on 
outcomes in sanitation and hygiene alone. Decisions on the choice of programme interventions are 
driven in part by external factors but also represent specific choices made at programme design. In 
the case of Zambia, the strong focus on sanitation may have resulted from an expectation that this 
would give greater efficiency (due to the add-on effects of building demand through CATS and 
supporting the supply of goods and services through sanitation marketing) and greater effectiveness 
by supporting a sustained change in sanitation practices. In SHEWA-B, the health impact was 
expected to extend beyond diarrhoeal diseases and include a reduction in ARIs and arsenic-related 
health effects. This may have resulted in higher costs as the programme included relatively expensive 
investments in water supplies.
• Defining the most appropriate balance between software support and hardware investment: 
The importance given to software activities is likely to affect cost-efficiency and cost-effectiveness. 
For the programmes studied, sanitation and hygiene components included mainly software costs, 
with the expectation that this would boost household demand, leading to household investments in 
sanitation or hygiene facilities. By contrast, water programme elements had much greater expenditure 
on hardware but even here the ratio of hardware to software expenditure varied greatly. In Nigeria, 
the ratio of expenditure on hardware to software was 99:1, although the software contribution in 
Nigeria was probably underestimated as it only included the training of local mechanics.20 By 
contrast the water programmes in Bangladesh and Mozambique had a much lower hardware-to-
20 This was the only software cost that could be estimated.
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software ratio of around 9:1. Social mobilisation included setting up water committees and 
sensitising communities for the physical maintenance and financial management of water points. 
Bangladesh included a strong health promotion dimension as community health promoters 
provided support and motivation to households to invest in private water supplies which were tested 
to ensure that they produced arsenic-safe water. Greater investments in software potentially drive  
up costs and could reduce VFM in the short-term, but the expectation is that they would eventually 
contribute to more sustained actual outcomes reflected in greater efficiency, effectiveness and 
cost-effectiveness. The lack of outcome data in the programmes under review means that it  
was not possible to confirm such an assumption.
• Defining the most appropriate share of Indirect Programme Support costs. IPS costs varied 
significantly between programmes. They represented between 9% (in Ethiopia) and 51% (in 
Nigeria) of total programme expenditure. Lower IPS yields lower total costs, which can be taken as 
an indicator of greater economy and efficiency – in Ethiopia, for example, IPS accounted for only 
7% of programme costs, making the cost per person who gained access to water amongst the lowest. 
The cost per person was higher in Mozambique and in Nigeria, where IPS accounted for 32% and 
38% of the cost per person who gained access to a new public water point respectively.21 However, 
apparent efficiency might be misleading as a stronger focus on capacity-building may reinforce the 
ability to institutionalise the approach over the long-term and could yield lower costs over time. For 
example, in PRONASAR CF Mozambique, costs were initially high and efficiency was low as the 
programme implementation arrangements were being established. Low efficiency was also linked to 
delays in fund transfers from donors. However, the programme’s VFM indicators subsequently 
improved to a point where the government-led programme now appears to yield good VFM when 
compared to other WASH projects in the country, such as the One Million initiative previously 
implemented by UNICEF. 
At programme design stage, it should be possible to ensure that IPS activities are focused on 
establishing strong programme management and oversight, with resulting positive effects on VFM 
over the longer-term. In five of the programmes analysed, IPS included the costs of building 
capacity, mostly for local governments. In Bangladesh, this capacity building component was 
separately identified as a component, which had the advantage of enabling planned outputs and 
outcomes to be tracked.
During programme implementation, other internal factors should be addressed to give managers 
greater control over decisions that may have an impact on VFM, such as for the procurement of 
goods and services, selection and training of staff, and levels of oversight and monitoring:   
• Strengthening procurement practices. In Bangladesh and Mozambique, national and local 
government procurement processes were used to purchase some goods and services. These systems 
are often said to be non-transparent and may lead to price distortions. On the other hand, local 
government staff are often very experienced and able to manage procurement systems with which 
they are familiar, leading to efficiency gains. For example, in Bangladesh public procurement of 
drilling for deep tubewells remained on track throughout the project.  Innovative contracts linking 
payment to verified results could potentially drive up efficiency and effectiveness but their impact in 
terms of improving VFM would need to be more thoroughly tracked. There was limited use of 
output-based contracts in the programmes that the VFM-WASH consortium analysed, with the 
exception of drilling contracts for tubewells/ boreholes. 
• Selection and training of implementers: The quality of promotional work impacts on behaviour 
change and the extent to which households are willing to invest in new goods and services. The 
capacity and retention of staff of local NGOs varies, especially if salaries are low. Thus investing in 
training and support provided to local government and NGOs is important. For instance, in 
Bangladesh in 2010, in response to reported patchy performance of Community Health Promoters 
(CHPs), UNICEF appointed two experienced NGOs (WaterAid and PLAN) to support the local 
NGO providers, train CHPs and promote standardised reporting.  This increased the cost of IPS 
but had a positive impact on performance. 
21  It was not possible to include all IPS costs for all programmes (including the portion borne by the government for all 
programmes) in a consistent manner (see section 4.1.2). IPS is likely to be underestimated in Ethiopia, as it excludes 
government contribution at local levels, and slightly over-estimated in Nigeria
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• Monitoring outputs and outcomes. Active monitoring of outputs and sustainable outcomes can be 
used to reveal unexpected changes or compare the quality of implementation in different parts of 
the programme. This can improve accountability and create performance incentives. In Zambia, a 
Performance Monitoring System was introduced in 2014 to track project performance at district, 
province and national levels, informing reporting by using mobile-to-web (M2W) technology. 
Primary data collected by Community Champions and Environmental Health Officers allowed 
monitoring systems to collect and analyse real-time data. The expansion of M2W monitoring 
combined with the introduction of NGOs as facilitators from mid-2013 led to cost-efficiency 
improvements during 2014. Programme cost per new person gaining access to improved sanitation 
or a hand-washing facility decreased from US$ 8.3 to US$3.4 between mid 2013 and the end  
of 2014. Using the mobile-to-web monitoring tool most likely allowed generating a number of 
efficiency gains, as summarised in Box 8 below. These estimates are provided only for reference; they 
were not calculated by the programme implementers and are not necessarily based on the same 
methodology. 
Box 8. Cost efficiency of mobile-to-web monitoring tools – Example from Zambia
UNICEF Zambia estimated that the cost of implementing the CATS component in districts using 
M2W was 30% lower than in districts using paper-based surveillance tools (at a cost per new user  
of improved sanitation of US$ 1.65 compared to around US$ 2 to 2.5 per new user of improved 
sanitation for other implementing partners not using mobile-to-web). A number of efficiencies  
have been noticed when using the mobile-to-web monitoring tool:
• It substitutes hardware for Human Resources effort, both reducing data errors and increasing  
cost efficiency. 
• It improves intervention uptake through (i) efficient targeted monitoring, (ii) an incentive-based 
system linked to the adequacy of reports and (iii) timely disbursement of output-based financial 
incentives to champions (around US$ 10 per verified ODF village).
• It reduces the need for managerial capacity for large-scale coverage: M2W allows one partner to 
manage interventions in up to 29 districts at the same time; comparatively, other partners can only 
manage 4 districts at the same time. The per-district management costs are therefore reduced by  
a factor of 7. 
• Data can be used in a timely manner to provide more accurate and efficient support activities at 
district, ward and community level: the implementing stakeholders can select where to support  
and verify intervention progress based on data analysis.
• It provides clear, simple visualization of data that effectively mobilizes traditional chiefs to monitor 
villages’ progress towards ODF status.
Source: UNICEF communication, “Overview of achievements and ways forward for the roll-out of the mobile-to-web monitoring framework. 
(2014, October 17)
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6 Challenges and recommendations  
for VFM analysis 
The VFM-WASH project team encountered a number of challenges in conducting VFM analysis, 
which would no doubt also be met by other organisations conducting a similar type of analysis to 
move beyond the current rather crude unit cost figures used in the sector. 
Improved and more regular VFM analysis would allow programme managers to use this as a 
management tool, and potentially as an advocacy tool to demonstrate their performance and attract 
funding. This section formulates recommendations for programme implementers to improve data 
collection so as to facilitate VFM analysis, and for funders to promote and mainstream a VFM 
culture within the sector. 
6.1 Challenges in doing VFM analysis
The VFM-WASH consortium members have met two types of challenges when conducting VFM 
analysis for this project, which can be roughly separated between “institutional and attitudinal” 
challenges and “data-related” challenges. 
Institutional and attitudinal challenges made it quite difficult to get stakeholders, including 
programme implementers and funders, to engage with the analysis and fully support it. Stakeholders 
at country level were not familiar with the approach and had a limited understanding of it. This 
challenge was partly addressed by providing further information, based on the initial methodological 
note developed for the project. Despite this, some implementers had limited trust in the methodology’s 
ability to yield meaningful results and a degree of distrust towards an approach that may introduce 
distortions; fearing an excessive focus on “counting taps and toilets” as opposed to measuring the 
value of investing in long-term capacity building of government institutions and local implementers.22 
All of these factors need to be duly recognised and the potential of VFM analysis to support 
programme management should not be over-emphasised: it is one tool amongst others and  
the results of a VFM analysis need to be combined with other types of analysis, particularly  
a qualitative analysis focusing on processes, in order to inform programme-level decisions. 
Data-related challenges were met in all of the programmes under review. A summary of the  
main data-related challenges encountered is provided below: 
• Data on expenditure tend to be reported only by type of expenditure (on capital goods, 
services, salaries etc.) rather than by type of activity (e.g. government expenditure). It was only 
possible to allocate the data to activities by making assumptions on what type of inputs were 
actually included in each category. As a result, inputs and outputs were not tracked in a consolidated 
manner, which meant that it was necessary to piece together the information manually.
 – In Nigeria, UNICEF reports expenditure under eight reporting categories, which are different 
from the ten reporting categories in the SHAWN budget. In order to allow the comparison 
between budgeted- and actual spending, these reporting categories need to be harmonised.  
In addition, in order to allow an analysis of the efficiency and effectiveness of specific outputs  
and outcomes, reporting categories need to be attributed to specific outputs and activities. 
 – In Mozambique, expenditure recorded in financial reports using broad categories of expenses 
(staff, services, goods, construction etc.) had to be allocated to each component based on the  
level of government at which each contract was procured. 
22  One potential additional factor can be an inherent reluctance to share data, for fear of not comparing favourably with other 
programmes in the same country or in other countries. This could be detected in isolated cases, but most organisations 
contacted were on the whole willing to share data and be transparent.
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• In the case of multi-donors programmes, input and output data for the programme were 
often tracked through a number of different systems and reported for different funders using 
different formats, which made VFM analysis more complex.
 – In Bangladesh, input and output data for the programme were often tracked through a number 
of different systems and were not consolidated. Because the programme is primarily implemented 
by a government department much of the detailed financial information has to be extracted from 
governmental financial reporting systems.  These are not particularly well designed for tracking 
expenditures against detailed programme components. UNICEF staff in Bangladesh reported 
that they had experienced challenges in reconciling financial data and output data.
 – In Mozambique, donor-driven reporting requirements were distorting the way in which the 
information was tracked and reported. The Annual Report (“Relatorio Balanço”) only reported 
externally funded outputs of the Common Fund. By contrast, the reporting for the internally 
funded outputs was weak and could not be separated out from other sources of Pillar A funding. 
Thus, this study focused on the externally funded PRONASAR CF activities.23 
• Key data gaps regarding programme results constrained VFM analysis. Variability in terms of 
result reporting between programmes, and within programmes (between implementing partners, 
regions, years) made it sometimes difficult to consistently apply the VFM methodology. 
Assumptions sometimes had to be made to fill the gaps when data was missing. For example: 
 – In Mozambique, information about the number of latrines constructed as a result of programme 
intervention in the 15 districts targeted by the PRONASAR CF was not available at central level 
broken down by district: it was therefore not possible to separate out results between what the CF 
had achieved and what other programmes had done. Such breakdown could only be estimated 
from the number of latrines built in each province. This significantly reduced the level of 
accuracy of the VFM estimates. 
 – In Zambia, although UNICEF consistently reported on assumed outcomes, there was generally 
very limited data for outputs, i.e. on the number of villages triggered or the number of training 
sessions, etc. Outputs were reported by NGOs as part of their contractual requirements, but this 
information was not collated in a consolidated manner, and different NGOs reported using 
different indicators. As a result, the analysis of efficiency and cost-efficiency was weak because it 
was necessary to make assumptions to fill in the gaps. 
• Few programmes had reliable data on actual outcomes of WASH investments.
 – SHEWA-B in Bangladesh had the best outcome data. The national monitoring systems used by 
DPHE and other Government of Bangladesh agencies are not particularly strong and lack a focus 
on outcome monitoring. Recent efforts to improve and modernise surveillance of water points at 
DPHE are a significant step forward and will help improve the monitoring of outputs in future, 
provided that DPHE maintain funding of their new GIS team. UNICEF’s support to DPHE in 
this regard has been critical in building capacity to track functionality and water quality 
performance of the thousands of public water points for which DPHE remains responsible.  This 
may be particularly important in Bangladesh which faces the very specific challenge of arsenic 
contamination in groundwater. In SHEWA-B as a whole there was a strong commitment to 
monitoring.  However, multiple monitoring processes resulted in some information overload, so 
that monitoring information was not always used as effectively as it might have been. This was 
particularly a problem for DPHE whose staff do not all have strong M&E or management 
capacity. The programme also showed a particularly strong commitment to evaluation. However, 
while there was a strong commitment to measuring outputs and hygiene outcomes and health 
impacts, there was little or no attention to measuring water and sanitation outcomes. 
 – In Mozambique, information on outcomes was not available but may become available when 
SINAS (the National Water and Sanitation Information System that collects information on both 
the rural and urban water and sanitation sectors) becomes fully operational, and when data is 
regularly entered and made available. Since 2009, considerable investments have been made 
towards strengthening SINAS, but its implementation has been repeatedly delayed, partly due to 
a lack of funding for inputting data at district level. 
23 except for small water piped schemes to which the Government of Mozambique was also contributing
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 – In Zambia, a mobile to web (M2W) data collection tool was developed, which collects indicators 
for S&H facilities usage. However, this data should be systematically tracked and reported in 
UNICEF progress reports. 
 – Data on outcomes and impacts were not available for SHAWN programme areas in Nigeria. An 
impact study was carried out in 2014 by a research team from the Royal Tropical Institute from 
Amsterdam. However this study covered a larger geographical area than the LGAs covered by 
SHAWN. As SHAWN programme areas could not be isolated in this study, the results of the 
impact evaluation could not be used to calculate cost-effectiveness for this VFM study.
 – In Pakistan, data on sustained actual outcomes was very scarce. Indeed the only sources were 
limited KAP surveys conducted at the end of the intervention. 
 – With the exception of Bangladesh, none of the programmes had reliable baseline data on access 
to and use of water and sanitation services or key hygiene behaviours prior to project or 
programme implementation.  Bangladesh was also the only programme whose monitoring and 
evaluation also tracked the baseline and end line status of neighbouring non-project areas, which 
enables some assessment of the specific impact of the programme.  The consequent availability of 
detailed outcome-level data can result in an apparent lower level of performance of this project at 
the outcome level when compared to others where baseline and comparator information are not 
available.  Because of this type of information asymmetry, the interpretation of outcome data and 
comparisons of cost-efficiency between programmes must always be done with care. 
• No programme collected indicators that allowed equity of inputs, outputs or outcomes to be 
monitored, for example by assessing whether the programme provided delivered sustainable 
outcomes that benefited people who needed it most.
• Some of the data gaps were filled using Objective 2 national survey results (in Mozambique, 
Bangladesh and Ethiopia). This data is statistically significant at the national level but not for 
programme areas, so outcomes observed cannot be directly attributed to the programmes studied. 
Thus, the resulting analysis only provides an indication of the range of programme outcomes, and 
should be considered with care.
6.2 Recommendations for programme 
implementers 
VFM analysis can support performance-based management by giving managers crucial quantitative 
metrics, backed by qualitative analysis. By comparing a poorly performing programme against a 
higher performing one with similar objectives and activities in the same country, a manager can 
identify key VFM drivers and areas in which the worse-performing programme could be improved.
Yet, as mentioned in Section 6.1 above, while all programmes were subject to monitoring and 
evaluation and financial reporting, data were not always available and were of variable quality. There 
could be conflicting or inconsistent data in different locations and methodologies for computing 
data were not always clear. This limited the ability to link expenditure to results and apply the VFM 
methodology as initially envisaged.
This section outlines specific recommendations that will help programme managers conduct more 
detailed VFM analysis as part of routine programme management activities, to support the 
formulation of programme management decisions. This will require programme management tools 
to be strengthened, in order to collect the right type of data, and to store and analyse it in a way that 
produces meaningful and useful results for programme managers.
6.2.1 Develop a clear logframe for monitoring results  
and use it consistently
Variability of reporting between programmes, and within programmes (between implementing 
partners, regions, years) made it difficult to apply the VFM methodology consistently.
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Indicators should be clearly defined for all outputs, assumed outcomes and sustained actual 
outcomes (as defined in the VFM methodology), and should all be summarised in Annual Progress 
Reports. Moreover, expenditure also needs to be reported against the same activities and results as in 
the logframe. Where governmental expenditure-tracking systems are used, it would be necessary to 
introduce a programme-specific expenditure-tracking system to code expenditure as and when 
incurred and to allocate it to specific activities. 
6.2.2 Develop a centrally managed tool to track inputs  
and outputs jointly
None of the programmes studied was jointly tracking data on results and expenditure. Whereas 
expenditure data was usually available, it was not broken down and recorded by activity and the 
timing of such expenditure as compared to the timing of results was also uncertain. As a result, 
considerable efforts were required to match them to manually piece together the information and 
conduct VFM analysis. 
A common reporting framework needs to be created so that both expenditure and results can be 
recorded based on the activities and results set out in the logframe. A simple (Excel) tool can then 
be developed to track jointly inputs and results. This will allow value for money indicators to be 
estimated on a regular basis and help to identify where and when programmatic adjustments are 
needed. 
A crucial piece of information for estimating VFM indicators relates to contracts let by the 
programme, their purpose, budgets and actual expenditures. In order to reconcile expenditure with 
outputs, financial reporting categories need to be connected to specific outputs. Recording 
expenditure by contract type would remove the need to interpret expenditure lines in financial 
reports (for example trying to understand what is actually covered by ‘goods’, ‘services’ or ‘capital 
expenditure’). Tracking contract expenditure on a regular basis in a Management Information 
System would be a key element to managing spending more efficiently and would encourage future 
data collection for VFM analysis.
To track expenditure based on the type of contracts and activities procured, it is recommended to 
create activity codes and compile in a single management tool the contracts that are let out together 
with their disbursement plans. This tool can then be updated monthly with information on the 
actual disbursements made.
6.2.3 Strengthen the monitoring of sustained actual 
outcomes and their equity
Information on sustained actual outcomes was critically lacking in all programmes analysed by the 
VFM-WASH project with the notable exception of Bangladesh. This is problematic, as the 
emphasis on the sustainability of investments is only going to increase post-2015 with the planned 
adoption of the Sustainable Development Goals. 
M&E systems should seek to collect data on the actual number of beneficiaries who gain access to 
water and sanitation during the programme but also the number of people over time who are still 
actively using the services implemented by the programme at the intended service level (at the 
outcome level). 
More data also needs to be collected on the equity of outputs and outcomes achieved. None of the 
programmes collected indicators that allowed monitoring of equity, for example by assessing 
whether the programme provided delivered sustainable outcomes that benefited the people who 
need it most. Outcome data need to be monitored for different groups, to address potential areas of 
inequity such as by poverty level, gender, or social group (e.g. castes). 
It is also essential that outcome data is made accessible and shared across sector actors at all levels of 
programme management. Conducting the VFM analysis on a routine basis and using it for 
management purposes would give a clear purpose and pathway for using outcome data and 
therefore provide a stronger incentive for collecting data on outcomes during programme 
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implementation but also in the future, measuring sustainable outcomes when the programmes have 
ended. 
6.3 Recommendations for funders 
The WASH sector requires a strategic change in culture: programme funders and implementers 
should start demanding more robust metrics for evaluating performance and supporting funding 
decisions, without losing sight of the other essential elements which cannot always be measured, 
such as the equity and cultural acceptability of programmes. The involvement of funders is essential 
to promote a VFM culture within the sector.
6.3.1 Request VFM analysis from programme implementers
As seen in Section 6.1 above, VFM analysis requires some degree of effort from implementers to 
adapt M&E and financial reporting systems, and develop ownership of the VFM methodology. 
Benefits are not always immediately visible. This can make it difficult for implementers to make  
the first step. When donors start requesting VFM analysis on a more regular and consistent basis, 
programme implementers will start adopting this as part of their standard “modus operandi” and 
will start seeing how to use the data to improve programme management. VFM analysis is most 
insightful when combined with a full evaluation at mid-term or the end of the programme, which 
means that a VFM analysis should be incorporated in standard Terms of Reference for this type  
of evaluation, with clear guidance for undertaking it. 
Funders should also take a stronger interest in helping programme implementers formulate the 
VFM questions that matter and develop adequate and relevant M&E systems to help answer those 
questions. For example, we have found that none of the programmes analysed had sufficient M&E 
data to be able to track the equity dimension of VFM results. This would have required computing 
VFM indicators for different groups (classified by income or level of social exclusion), which in turn 
requires inputs and results for these groups to be tracked separately. As reducing inequities is likely 
to be a much more explicit concern in the post-2015 era, developing adequate systems to perform 
this type of VFM analysis will become critical.    
6.3.2 Support the development of tools to facilitate  
VFM analysis
One factor limiting widespread use of VFM analysis is that many sector professionals are unfamiliar 
with the overall approach and specific concepts. Many sector professionals are unfamiliar with 
budget management and tracking, particularly for programmes that are managed through broader 
public management systems. To overcome these difficulties, funders should invest in the 
development of tools that can facilitate VFM analysis. 
The “How to do VFM analysis for WASH programmes” publication developed as part of the 
VFM-WASH project provides a conceptual framework and steps for applying the methodology, and 
can be used as manual during training sessions. Given that the VFM analysis needs to be tailored to 
different programme logframes, we do not think that a universal tool for computing VFM 
indicators will be useful. However, for new programmes starting to develop their logframes, M&E 
and financial reporting, it could be useful to develop a standard spreadsheet (Excel) tool for tracking 
jointly expenditure, outputs and outcomes that could be used as a reference template. 
Programme implementers need specific guidance on analysing the VFM of interventions where 
outputs and outcomes are less specific and harder to measure such as interventions to build capacity, 
or strengthen monitoring. The SHEWA-B project was stood out for in the fact that it identified this 
type of software activity as a specific component with its own outputs and outcomes. In other cases, 
these activities were treated as an overall investment and included in the IPS costs. In future, it 
would be important to think further on how these activities can best be incorporated into a VFM 
analysis, both to inform the management of these activities and to alleviate fears that a VFM 
approach could trigger a shift back to counting taps and toilets as opposed to focusing on longer 
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term sector support efforts. The methodology for estimating the VFM of more complex 
interventions, such as hygiene promotion, where a multiplicity of factors influence whether  
or not people adopt hygienic behaviours, should be further developed. 
6.3.3 Support capacity building and information sharing  
on VFM analysis
Training and capacity building are required to disseminate the VFM analysis methodology among 
programme implementers, make the case for its usefulness and help them adapt and develop tools  
as set up in the section above.
To overcome fears about sharing information, it will be important to encourage organisations  
to first use VFM analysis as an internal management tool to track performance of their own 
programmes over time. As they become more familiar with the approach and confident about  
their results, they will become more willing to share information and learn from each other. The 
establishment of a community of practice and other types of information sharing arrangement  
will be essential for triggering exchanges between practitioners on problems, solutions and uses  
of VFM analysis. 
Ultimately, the value of VFM analysis will increase when more data points become available, 
particularly for programmes implemented in the same country. Apart from the data points 
themselves, which can be difficult to interpret when context and causal links are challenging to 
understand, a narrative analysis is needed to describe how programme managers and funders are 
using results from previous VFM analysis or conducting VFM analysis for their own programmes. 
These narratives could discuss what VFM questions funders and programme managers have asked 
themselves, what they could (or could not) measure, what changes they made as a result of these 
findings and how these changes impacted VFM indicators. The present report goes some way 
towards this but a longer-term approach is needed to maximise learning, which would facilitate 
direct exchanges between programme implementers and funders through a community of practice 
and regular exchanges on VFM in WASH. 
Funders have a key role to play in supporting these activities so as to support the development  
of a “VFM culture” in the sector. Lessons from other sectors that are at a more advanced stage  
of development in this area, such as the health sector, should also be drawn out with support  
from funders.
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Annex A – Key references
A.1. Background documents on the concept  
of Value for Money and its application in the 
WASH sector
• DFID (2011) VFM approach
• DFID WASH portfolio review (2012)
• DFID’s approach to VFM (DFID, 2011)
• ICAI (2011) ICAI’s Approach to Effectiveness and Value for Money, Report 1
• Jackson P., (2012), Value for money and international development: Deconstructing myths to 
promote a more constructive discussion, http://www.oecd.org/dac/effectiveness/49652541.pdf
• National Audit Office, Analytical framework for assessing Value for Money, http://www.bond.org.
uk/data/files/National_Audit_Office__Analytical_framework_for_assessing_Value_for_Money.pdf
A.2. VFM-WASH project reports
The methodology used for conducting the VFM analysis can be found in the guidance document 
produced for WASH sector practitioners: 
• Prat M-A., Trémolet S., Ross I. (2015) How to do Value for Money analysis for water, sanitation 
and hygiene (WASH) programmes; Guidance note.
Sources and detailed references for data presented in this report can be found in the programme-
level reports:
• Evans B., Bates L, Amal H., (2015), Analysing the Value for Money of SHEWA-B in Bangladesh.
• Mujica A., Brown J., Halwiindi H. (2015), Analysing the Value for Money of DFID’s Sanitation 
and Hygiene Programme in Zambia. 
• Prat M-A., Ross I., Kebede. S (2015), Analysing the Value for Money of Water Supply and 
Sanitation Programme (WSSP) in Ethiopia
• Prat M-A., Trémolet S., Sousa L., Thompson G. (2015), Analysing the Value for Money of 
PRONASAR Common Fund investments in Mozambique.
• Ross I., Ensink J., Memon Y. (2015), Analysing the Value for Money of DFID’s contribution to the 
humanitarian WASH response to the 2010 Pakistan floods
• Tincani L., Biran A., Oke I. (2015), Analysing the Value for Money of DFID’s SHAWN-I 
programme in Nigeria.
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Notes
VFM-WASH
Improving Value for Money and sustainability in WASH programmes More information available 
at www.vfm-wash.org
